On 21 January 2021, two suicide bombings in a crowded market in central Baghdad killed 32 people and severely injured another 110. The Islamic State (IS) wasted no time in claiming responsibility for the attack. It was the first suicide attack on the Iraqi capital in nearly two years since the Islamic State (IS) was “defeated” in 2019 by the 83-member ‘Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS’, which includes the United States (US), European Union, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. While the Coalition has claimed that it has “liberated all territory controlled by ISIS in Iraq and Syria [and] has continued its efforts to disrupt ISIS’s ability to organise, plan attacks, and recruit,” recent events in the region show that IS has, in fact, enhanced its capabilities to plan and organise attacks.
Since April, attacks by IS have been on the rise in both Iraq and Syria. The group carried out a car bombing in Baghdad last month that killed one person and injured several others. It has also mounted multiple attacks against security forces in the region, including the Kurdish Peshmerga, the Iraqi army, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and the Iran-backed Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF). Earlier this month, IS claimed responsibility for blowing up two oil fields in the Kirkuk region of Iraqi Kurdistan.
This sudden increase in IS activity comes despite the strong presence of security forces in Iraq and Syria. The SDF and Kurdish Asayish troops, backed by Coalition forces, have been instrumental in preventing attacks in Syria by destroying the group’s hideouts and detaining suspected IS members. Likewise, the Peshmerga and Iraqi armies have also carried out raids on suspected IS locations in Iraq and hindered the capability of IS members to coordinate through its vast network of underground cells.
Yet, IS has persisted. To understand why the Islamic State keeps coming back, it is important to look at not only the security situation in the region but also the conditions that enable the spread and seeming intractability of the group’s vicious ideology.
The biggest concern with regard to security is the lack of coordination among forces in the area. A 2016 report by RAND found that Shia militias in Iraq, under the banner of the PMF, “were not integrated with the overall military effort”; this continues to be the case even today. After an IS attack on its troops in May, the Kurdish Peshmerga warned that IS has taken advantage of the “security void” and thus called for better communication between the various federal and regional security forces in Iraq. In Syria, the Russia-backed Syrian government forces refuse to cooperate with the US-backed SDF, which has led to a steady increase in IS activities in the country.
While flaws in the strategy to combat the Islamic State can explain some of the reasons why the group has increased its activity, the security angle alone cannot account for why its ideology has endured for so long. In this context, it is crucial to analyse the role of sectarian tensions, the refugee problem, and the lack of effective governance in exploring why the region is witnessing an IS resurgence.
A recent US Department of Defence (DOD) report warns that the presence of PMF in Iraq threatens to “erode all the gains that have been made” by Coalition allies in fighting IS. This can be attributed to the fact that the Shia-dominated PMF exerts tight control over Iraq’s borders, resulting in excessive policing, especially in Sunni-dominated areas. “Shia militia groups belonging to the PMF continue to operate in Sunni areas against the will of the local populations,” the report notes.
The PMF is a loose coalition of local Iraqi Shia militias, including the Badr Brigades and Kataib Hezbollah, that were founded in 2014 after Iraq’s top Shia cleric, Ayatollah Ali Sistani, issued a fatwa calling on Iraqis to join the fight against the Islamic State. While the Forces have been effective in dealing with IS activities, they have also tried to gain more control in Iraq. Shia militias have engaged in controlling the movement of people and goods through the border and have even set up a parallel taxation system, wherein a number of Sunni-owned businesses have been taxed. The PMF has also involved itself in local religious matters, controlling Sunni religious sites and endowments. All of this has led to deep resentment among Iraq’s Sunni population against the influence of Shia militias. The DOD report claims that IS is taking advantage of this sectarian rift between Sunnis and Shias by using these divisions as a recruitment tool.
Another area of concern is the issue of refugees and the repatriation of the wives and children of former IS fighters. At the centre of the festering refugee problem is the Al Hol refugee camp in northern Syria, which hosts more than 60,000 people, the majority of whom are women and children, hailing from a wide range of countries.
Many international actors, including European nations and the US, have refused to repatriate refugees, citing radicalisation concerns and public opinion. While some of these concerns are indeed valid, inaction is not a solution. US Central Command chief Kenneth McKenzie warned in an interview that existing conditions in Al Hol are so dire that it risks becoming a “fertile ground” for IS’ next generation. Shortages of food and clean water, along with poor health conditions have added to the camp’s misery. McKenzie also noted that children in the camp are extremely vulnerable to radicalisation in the Islamic State doctrine. “It will be a military problem in a few years if we don’t fix the non-military aspects of it now,” McKenzie said, referring to the rapid spread of militant ideology within the camp.
Furthermore, the coronavirus pandemic has also unleashed an unprecedented economic and social crisis in Iraq, which has, in turn, led to a spike in poverty and unemployment. Iraq’s Sunni minority could be disproportionately affected as a result of this crisis, as Sunni majority regions are mostly cut off from the country’s oil wealth. Moreover, the destruction of large swathes of Sunni Arab dominated regions in airstrikes against IS has left the community even more vulnerable, with very few opportunities to rebuild. This has led to a small section of Iraq’s Sunnis supporting IS, with the group exploiting the grievances of the Sunnis.
Keeping these three factors in mind, it is essential that all stakeholders engaged in the post-IS reconstruction of Iraq and Syria acknowledge and address the non-security concerns. The recent rise in IS attacks in the region shows that purely security-related measures cannot thwart the resurgence of the group. While it is difficult to kill an ideology, tackling the root causes of what makes the group’s ideology attractive to some communities can go a long way. In fact, it is worth noting that when the Islamic State first took control over large parts of Iraq and Syria, it exploited the narratives around poor economic conditions, sectarian strife, and failed government institutions to gain the support of disenfranchised pockets of society. While another round of counterterrorism operations could certainly once again weaken the IS, in order to prevent this scenario from repeating itself, major actors must rethink their regional strategy to contain IS, and focus more on addressing sectarian tensions, the refugee crisis, and financial vulnerabilities.
Why Is There a Resurgence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria?
Increasing attacks on security forces by the Islamic State have raised concerns about the group’s capabilities and its ability to stage a comeback.
May 19, 2021
SOURCE: FAZEL HAWRAMY/RUDAW