As the United States gears up to implement ‘snapback’ sanctions on the Iranian regime despite opposition from its peers at the United Nations Security Council, Tehran has pulled no stops in threatening military retaliation. In particular, the two sides’ ongoing tensions in the strategic Strait of Hormuz is of utmost importance, as the US Navy, along with a few allies, continue their surveillance of Iranian moves in the crucial maritime theatre. However, are these exercises sustainable for Washington to continue, and is there any alternative to a naval face-off?
Although the Strait of Hormuz is geographically small—its narrowest point is just 21 nautical miles across—it is considered an extremely crucial chokepoint since it sees the most shipping traffic in the world. The channel is so crucial because it connects the Persian Gulf with the Indian Ocean, and it also separates Iran from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman, who are strategic US allies in the region. The Strait accounts for all sea shipping traffic from Gulf countries—this includes the exchange of liquefied natural gas and crude from not just Iran, Oman, and the UAE, but also Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar. According to 2018 statistics from the US Energy Information Administration, around 21 million barrels of oil—both crude and refined—pass through the waters on a daily basis, accounting for a third of the globe’s sea-traded petroleum, with a daily value of $1.197 billion (according to oil prices at the time of calculation).
In the 1980s, the Strait became a point of conflict during the so-called “Tanker War” as part of the larger Iran-Iraq conflict, with each side vying to sink the other’s energy shipments. To avoid getting targeted in the crossfire, Kuwait had reflagged its ships under the American registry to obscure their real origin. And while crude oil continued to flow from the region at the time, insurance rates for tankers operating in Hormuz increased by a whopping 400%.
More recently, tensions in the Strait increased in 2018, after US President Donald Trump’s administration withdrew from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The pact was signed between Iran and world powers as part of an international effort to get Tehran to restrict its nuclear ambitions in exchange for a removal or reduction of economic sanctions. However, Washington’s implementation of crippling sanctions—aimed not just at Iran’s nuclear development but the regime and its finances at large—triggered Tehran to threaten retaliation by closing the Strait and disrupting its trade flows.
Amidst escalating tensions between Iran and the US over the past few months, the prospect of a military skirmish between the Iranian and American navies in the Strait has significantly. Ever since the killing of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani by a US drone strike, Washington has been increasingly wary of Iranian threats to shut down access to the vital waterway. “We have always guaranteed the security of this strait,” Iranian President Hassan Rouhani had said in 2018, “Do not play with the lion’s tail, you will regret it forever,” he warned.
If Iran were to follow through with these threats, it would cause a massive disruption to international oil trade. Any kind of tanker traffic interference from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy (IRGCN) in the narrow waters could decrease supply for the whole world and send oil prices skyrocketing. Trump is extremely wary of this, as a flux in global pricing, regardless of its origin, would have a detrimental effect on the American economy. Further, despite Trump’s claims that the US has become “the largest producer of energy anywhere in the world!”, the country is still dependent on the Middle East for around 906,000 barrels of oil every day.
Although the importance of the waters to American interests is clear, in 2019, Trump actually questioned the presence of the US Navy in the Strait, and called on Japan, China, and others to protect their vessels passing through the region. In what seemed like an open invitation to Asian countries to take care of their own energy needs and maritime security, Trump questioned why the US and its allies continue to protect the globally relevant area for so many other countries without any compensation. While this is in line with his America-First policy, it also comes as a surprising move, especially since one did not expect Trump to invite China for military cooperation anywhere. However, as The Diplomat editor-at-large Ankit Panda notes, Beijing should embrace the moment and use it to expand the presence of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to the Persian Gulf, especially most of its oil and natural gas supply comes from Qatar, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. This would also be in line with the PLA’s previous justifications of increased naval presence in other international waters, which have mainly centred around piracy concerns and the protection of navigation freedoms in critical sea routes.
However, while several analysts believed that China would remain neutral in the region as tensions escalate between the Iranian regime and the Arab Gulf states, Beijing’s growing animosity towards Washington has shifted its posturing, bringing it closer to Tehran. China is already in maritime competition with the US in the South China Sea and the entire Indo-Pacific through the Strait of Malacca. Military exercises, combat ship deployments, and reconnaissance flights have increased confrontations of their navies and allies in global waters. It is also worth noting that the China-Iran defence deal, which has irked quite a few policymakers in Washington, includes strategic access to the Bandar-e-Jask, a port that lies on the Strait and stands to give Beijing an energy advantage.
Yet, even Beijing amps up strategic military ties with Iran, it continues to be energy-dependent on its Arab neighbourhood, and has thus kept conspicuously away from intervening in the Strait of Hormuz. China’s Assistant Foreign Minister Chen Xiaodong had responded to questions about an Iranian threat to the waters by deflecting from the issue entirely with a vague answer, saying that his government “consistently believes that the relevant country should do more to benefit peace and stability in the region, and jointly protect peace and stability there.” He added that China would continue to serve a “positive, constructive role” in the region to ensure that Iran coexists peacefully with its Gulf neighbours.
While experts have opined that there are several factors to deter Iran from closing the Strait—its own dependence on the trade route for survival being the most important one—the country also has smaller boats and submarine capabilities that can interrupt shipping by laying mines. Further, it also has other means by which it can disrupt petroleum exports from its Arab neighbours. Recent cyberattacks and drone attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure by Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen, as well as land trade routes passing through the region, provide ample opportunity for the Rouhani regime to thwart the stability of the oil market. Iran’s ability to engage in this kind of hybrid warfare, therefore, raises the stakes for the US.
Further, with respect to China, analysts believe that the IRGCN’s opposition to foreign naval presence at Iran’s ports, including the Imam Ali base in Chabahar and the Bandar-e-Jask, would block foreign military activity in the region, even from its allies. Therefore, New Delhi’s fears of losing Chabahar to China also seem misplaced, since China is also standing on shaky footing with respect to port access. As much as Beijing invests in Tehran and provides military support to the IRGC, it is highly unlikely that the People’s Liberation Army and its Navy will be provided space to have a substantial presence in Iran.
Therefore, the US pretty much stands alone in its security efforts in the international waters, which are global commons that other state militaries have avoided, as they are wary of getting caught in the crossfire of the US-Iran bilateral tiff. While the United Kingdom had said that the Royal Navy would resume escorting British vessels as a precautionary measure through the strait, the US was the only navy present to show video footage when Norwegian and Japanese-owned oil tankers were attacked in the waters in June 2019, just ahead of then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s diplomatic visit to Tehran.
Most recently, the IRGCN’s Commander Read Adm. Sardar Alireza Tangsiri said that Iranian drones had intercepted—meaning identified and observed—US vessels in the waterway, including aircraft carrier USS Nimitz. Referring to the US as “terrorists”, Tangsiri said, “We always avoid war, but if the enemies want to threaten and encroach upon our national interests in any part of the country, we will firmly stand up to any such move.”
If events over the past few weeks in the UN regarding the US’ forced reinstation of sanctions on Iran are any indication of the rest of the world’s views about the ongoing issue, it is safe to say that Tehran is currently operating with an air of superiority, thinking it has ‘won’ a global battle. Unless the US revokes its heavy sanctions regime, it continues to threaten the future of the Strait and increase its own energy insecurities, along with those of the rest of the world. In what seems to be an electoral move for Trump, the US Navy will continue to aimlessly carry out exercises, drills, and surveillance in the Strait of Hormuz, since the Iranian side does not appear to be willing to back down from its multi-pronged approach at bringing its adversary down until it fulfils its primary demand of lifting sanctions. Washington must adhere as this may provide the only opportunity for a diplomatic resolution to the issue. Therefore, policymakers across the world must continue to pressure Washington and improve coordination on their moves regarding Iran if they wish to see stability in oil markets, including Beijing, whose standing in the region remains ambiguous.
Why is the US Navy Still in the Strait of Hormuz?
The volatile Iranian regime has one major demand, and Washington must fulfil it instead of increasing maritime provocations if it wishes to reach a diplomatic end to bilateral tensions.
September 25, 2020