India has hinted at displeasure with Russia’s actions in Ukraine but continues to refrain from making any direct references to its only longtime ally, which it relies on for 60-70% of its military equipment. Washington, which is known to take a value-based approach, has not kept its disappointment with India’s stance a secret. Keeping this in mind, will India’s approach of prioritising its interests and historical friendships over (Western) principles end up harming its relationship with the United States (US), an equally important ally?
On February 28, India abstained from voting on a resolution introduced in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that condemned and called for an end to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and a withdrawal of its troops. When asked about its plans to sanction Russia, Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla said: “We have to see what sort of impact these sanctions will have on our own interests. Clearly, we need to study this carefully because any sanctions will have [an] impact on our existing relationship.” It abstained from a similar vote in the UN General Assembly just a few days later.
In response, Washington has warned that nations on the wrong side of history will bear the consequences of failing to live up to the West’s expectations. During a White House press briefing, President Joe Biden seemingly offered a veiled criticism of India’s stand, saying, “Any nation that countenances Russia’s naked aggression against Ukraine will be stained by association.”
Similarly, in a telephonic conversation with Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken urged India for a “strong collective response to condemn Russia’s invasion.”
However, on being directly questioned about India’s position on the crisis, Biden was more diplomatic with his words, saying that while New Delhi is not entirely in sync with the US on the tensions in Ukraine, the two sides are continuing consultations.
This diplomatic tact was further extended during State Department spokesperson Ned Price’s regular press briefing on February 25. When asked if the Ukrainian crisis could strain the India-US relationship, Price’s noted that the US understands India’s stance, saying, “We know India has a relationship with Russia that is distinct from the relationship that we have with Russia. Of course, that is okay,” he said. While Price expressed hope that India would take advantage of its unique relationship with Moscow and “use that leverage to good effect,” he underscored that India remains an essential ally of the US because they “share important interests and values.”
The spokesperson’s remarks came only hours after Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin after the crisis erupted on February 24, wherein the Indian leader only requested for the cessation of violence. Despite the perceived lack of action by India, the US’ careful comments indicate its hesitancy in pushing India to share its goal of isolating Russia.
This acquiescence is exactly what India’s foreign policy strategists were hoping for. Undisclosed sources from the Indian government cited by The Straits Times said that PM Modi’s government is “confident Washington will look the other way on this issue.” Echoing this sentiment, Nilanthi Samaranayake, the Director of the Strategy and Policy Analysis Program at the Washington D.C.-based Center for Naval Analyses, said, “It’s hard to imagine Washington moving away from its determination to expand defence and security ties with India over the past 20 years.”
Much of this confidence lies in India’s awareness of its indispensability as a counterbalance to China in the Indo-Pacific, meaning that differences over the Ukraine conflict are likely to blow over in order to prioritise Washington’s larger pivot eastwards.
Given its geographical proximity to China and the fact that it has the world’s second-largest military by personnel and is the third-largest spender on military upkeep, India offers a unique value that cannot be put at risk. It is no surprise then that despite being the only member of the Quad (India, Australia, the US, and Japan) that hasn’t imposed sanctions or even condemned Russia yet, there has been virtually no impact on bilateral ties with the US beyond hints at displeasure.
India has for decades prioritised a non-aligned and strategically autonomous foreign policy and the Ukraine crisis has further evidenced the success of that strategy, given that the US has clearly looked the other way despite India’s divergent foreign policy.
Moreover, this freedom the US has afforded India is not unprecedented. When Turkey purchased the Russian-made S-400 air defence systems in 2020, the US slapped it with sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). CAATSA deters US allies from purchasing defence equipment from Russia and other adversaries. However, when India purchased the same system last year, the US did not respond with any punitive measures.
India has also escaped punishment for its divergence from the US on various UN resolutions in the post-Cold War era, including on the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the ousting of the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia. More recently, India has refused to call on Myanmar’s military regime to step down.
In fact, the US has on various occasions sought to make special exceptions for India. When the two countries signed the 123 Agreement in 2008, the US went out of its way to approach the elite Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to grant a waiver to India and allow it to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from other countries. This Civil Nuclear Deal made India the only known country with nuclear weapons that is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty but is still allowed to commercially trade nuclear technology with the rest of the world.
Crucially, the US has also been one of India’s most vocal supporters in its bid for a permanent seat at the UNSC.
Therefore, despite carefully placed nudges and the odd public disagreement, it is clear that Washington will not seek to forcefully impose its worldview on India and that it respects New Delhi’s independence and much-vaunted “strategic autonomy.” On one hand, this is due to India’s value as a crucial ally in countering Chinese expansion across the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, in the context of the Ukraine war, there are indications that the West is relying on India to wield its ‘neutrality’ and influence as a responsible power to play the role of a mediator between Russia and the West. In fact, Ukraine’s envoy to New Delhi, Igor Polikha, recently requested the Indian leader to intervene and urge Vladimir Putin to end Russia’s violent activities in Ukraine, saying he is “hopeful” that Modi’s “stature” could make Putin reconsider his actions. Hence, while there is a growing clamour for India to speak out against Russian aggression, there is perhaps greater value in its silence, both for India and Ukraine.
The US Will Never Endanger Ties With India Over Its Silence on Russia
While there is a growing clamour for India to speak out against Russian aggression, there is perhaps greater value in its silence, both for India and Ukraine.
March 9, 2022
US President Joe Biden (R) with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014. IMAGE SOURCE: CLIFF OWEN/AP