Representatives from Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan recently met for another round of talks on the Nile water basin issue, a decades-long river boundary conflict over Addis Ababa’s construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Africa’s largest hydroelectric project. Despite several attempts at tripartite water cooperation deals among the three riparian states, no comprehensive deal has emerged yet. Simultaneously, water scarcity, climate variability, and the economic and safety challenges posed by the ongoing coronavirus pandemic continue to affect the lives of those dependent on the river basin for agriculture.
The conflict is primarily between Egypt and Ethiopia, who have starkly competing views when it comes to the use of the Nile. Egypt sees itself as the first and natural user of the Nile, exploiting its water more than any other state. The country is heavily dependent on the river for its water and agricultural needs, controlling 90% of the flow of the Blue Nile, which originates in Ethiopia. The Egyptian position on the GERD stems from fears that the dam will reduce its own supply of Nile water and that its diversion would lead to a significant amount of evaporation and water loss. Therefore, its paramount interest is in preserving the current status quo.
On the other hand, Ethiopia, which only consumes less than 1% of the river’s water right now, stands to significantly reduce drought and malnourishment by exercising its right to utilize the natural resources in its own territory by way of the GERD. Given that around two-thirds of its population lives without electricity, Ethiopia hopes to develop the project to meet its growing demands for energy. However, existing agreements on water-sharing signed in 1929 and 1959 are skewed in Egypt’s favour, giving the country a 55.5 billion cubic meters (BCM) share out of the annually available 74 BCM, as well as a veto over upstate development projects. Spare for Sudan, neither of these agreements recognized the interests of other riparian states on the Nile.
Both Ethiopia and Egypt have their own interpretations of how international law can serve their interests, especially with regards to the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. While unratified by both countries, this treaty is generally considered to be the most reliable representation of customary international law of watercourses. Many experts have referred to it to try and find an equitable solution to the issue, but its clauses have been open to interpretation by either side, leading to a further deadlock in negotiations.
In February 2020, talks brokered by Washington and the World Bank in February collapsed when Addis Ababa pulled out of the talks and rejected an agreement regarding the filling and operation of the GERD. Later in April, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced that the country would begin to fill the reservoir by fall of this year, with or without any agreements in place, and by July, satellite images of rainwater swelling up the tank’s reserves began to surface. But concerns for the Nile issue are not merely consigned to the pangs of regional geopolitics and baseless links to state sovereignty, as the matter has the possibility of turning into a humanitarian crisis. In Egypt, years of corruption and mismanagement, along with an ever-increasing population, have led to severe farmland losses and water shortages, leading local farmers to believe that the GERD would deepen the water crisis already hitting their villages. "The dam means our death," said Makhluf Abu Kassem, a farmer based in the Fayoum Oasis.
It is worth noting that the GERD has the capacity to hold 88% of the Nile’s mean annual flow, affecting the lives of around 140 million people in the region. While hydroelectricity generators are powered by the regulated release of water downstream, the Ethiopian administration has been developing the dam without engaging with riparian states downstream in addressing their material issues and has also blocked independent Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs) of the site. ESIAs form a crucial part of international environmental and development laws and are typically useful in determining the impact of projects before their development. But, even though GERD can be considered as a high-risk infrastructure, given the complex web of environmental rights, food security, and human rights dependent on its future course of action, the necessary techno-legal multilateral processes that should have guided its implementation are entirely absent.
Thus, no conclusive statements can be made about the project’s impact on downstream states, as nothing definitive regarding the hydrological, scientific, or environmental effects of the GERD are available. Ethiopia’s belief that the GERD would have transboundary benefits for all can also be questioned since transboundary ESIAs are absent to back their claims.
In April this year, Egypt and Sudan filed a request for intervention with the United Nations Security Council, citing Article 35 of the UN Charter, which pertains to international security threats. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called upon the nations to resume negotiations in tandem with the 2015 Declaration of Principles that requires the completion of ESIAs and using the findings as a primary reference before deciding on further courses of action in compliance with international law. Recent talks brokered by the African Union also failed; the parties reached an impasse, with the Egyptian and Sudanese representatives walking out after their Ethiopian counterpart attempted to shift the conversation to the countries’ shares in the waters rather than negotiating dam operations.
And as the parties reconvene once again for another attempt at reconciliation, there is still no clarity in the public sphere regarding the terms of the agreements being discussed, adding to the uncertainty and anger over the GERD’s potentially detrimental effects. The scale of the GERD project still necessitates ESIAs, and such checks must be forced upon Ethiopia, which has a shaky history with water-sharing and borders even bilaterally with neighbours Sudan and Somalia. The continuation of unilateral access to the dam’s water resources without international checks and balances in place could set a dangerous precedent for African transboundary rivers. Egyptian access to the Nile is pivotal to international security and trade in the MENA region, with the country being a crucial trade gateway for Africa and an important security provider to the Suez Canal. Further, for Sudan, the scarcity of freshwater would add to a piling mount of internal issues and may add fuel to existing endo-ethnic tensions.
In retrospect, Egypt water policy expert Amal Kandeel argues, Ethiopia could have generated the energy it requires using its geothermal resources and domestic rivers and may have been able to realize its power goals sooner and without the risks posed by the GERD. It also has the potential to develop abundant solar power as a sustainable alternative. According to Paul Sullivan, an energy security analyst at the National Defense University, the military tensions and regional political strains caused by the GERD could be alleviated if the country begins shifting focus towards its dormant geothermal capabilities.
But the GERD is hardly the only threat to the Nile, which flows through the ‘fragile ecosystems’ of the Sahara and the Sahel and whose watershed is already compromised due to severe land degradation and deforestation. The infestation of an invasive weed water hyacinth at Lake Tana also threatens to choke up the Blue Nile source. However, neither of the upstream countries, including Egypt and Ethiopia, have taken the responsibility to preserve the ecosystem while downstream states struggle to finance mitigation projects. Egypt's insistence that the issue needs ‘patience’ to resolve is dated considering the vast amount of time already wasted in failed negotiations and the massive insecurities looming on its people.
Therefore, a reliable strategy to resolve the GERD issue peacefully should not focus on the hard security aspect of the conflict but rather must include incentives for Addis Ababa to comply with international riparian water laws and environmental and development norms, since it has already pushed ahead with its plans. This would mean that Egypt and Sudan would need to compromise on their hard-line national security approaches to the issue and expand their goals for regional cooperation in order to push Ethiopia into conducting transboundary ESIAs. This could, and should, include the sharing of technology and resources required to maintain the health and longevity of the Nile.
Realistically, as rifts between Ethiopia and Egypt continue to widen and concerns of a possible regional war emerge in the discourse surrounding the conflict, it seems like Washington and Brussels need to step back and allow regional actors mediate the issue. Ethiopia has already rejected American solutions to the issue and the EU has deprioritized the GERD issue from its latest Presidency agenda. At the same time, the African Union, which has also attempted water diplomacy on the issue, unfortunately, lacks the required resources needed to convince actors to make compromises. Alternatively, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, who share cordial ties with all three parties, may be able to facilitate cooperation more effectively. Both Arab Gulf states have several security interests in the region and are currently looking to boost their influence in MENA against Turkey, Qatar, and Iran. The two countries were already involved in peace efforts between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the ongoing Nile issue provides them with a unique opportunity to solidify their regional peacemakers as well as putting an end to one of the most hostile and dangerous multilateral issues in the region.
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