Ukrainian officials have recently been complaining about Israel’s lacklustre support in the face of a possible Russian invasion. Last week, Ukraine’s Deputy Foreign Minister expressed concerns about a “lack of political support from Jerusalem” and called for “greater involvement.” Furthermore, Israel has refused to sell its Iron Dome missile defence system to Ukraine, despite direct requests by Kyiv.
This is despite the fact that Israel maintains cordial ties with Ukraine, especially since the Eastern European country has one of the largest Jewish populations in the world; Israel is also home to thousands of Ukrainian Jews. Furthermore, both sides enjoy solid economic ties. For instance, Ukraine has been Israel’s main wheat supplier for years and accounts for more than 50% of grains consumed by Israelis.
Given this and the fact that Israel maintains very close ties to the United States (US) and has been designated by Washington as a “major non-NATO ally,” Israel’s decision not to actively support Ukraine might come as a surprise. However, supporting Ukraine over Russia could severely hamper Israel’s operations in Syria to contain Iranian influence near its borders.
Since civil war broke out in Syria in 2011, Israel has been conducting airstrikes against Iranian proxies and weapons shipments to Lebanese militant group Hezbollah. Israel maintains that its airstrikes are meant to prevent archenemy Iran from increasing its military presence near Israeli borders and stop Hezbollah from expanding its missile arsenal.
However, following Russia’s intervention in the civil war in 2015 to prop up the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Israel has been forced to maintain a direct line of communication with Russia regarding its operations, so as to prevent an incident in which Russian forces are targeted by Israeli airstrikes. So far, Russia and Israel have been able to establish a common understanding regarding their role in the conflict. According to reports, Russia has allowed Israel to continue its air raids as long as Israeli airstrikes do not directly threaten the Assad regime—a close ally of Moscow—and avoid targeting Russian infrastructure.
Since 2015, Russia has emerged as the dominant power in Syria. Russian airstrikes on rebel-held territories have helped Syrian regime forces put an end to the rebel offensive. Moreover, Russia has allowed Iranian proxy groups like Hezbollah to operate in the country, as they have helped the Syrian regime in the ground offensive against anti-Assad forces.
Against this backdrop, Israel has sought closer ties with Russia. In fact, former Israeli Prime Minister (PM) Benjamin Netanyahu visited Russia 15 times between 2011 and 2015. In October 2021, current PM Naftali Bennett met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow and announced that both sides had reached an understanding regarding Israel’s operations in Syria.
However, recent events threaten to undo the mutual understanding between Israel and Russia over Syria. Israeli airstrikes over the past few months have not only targeted Iranian proxies but also resulted in Syrian troop casualties. Israeli fighter jets also targeted the Russian controlled Syrian port of Latakia twice in December, and one of the strikes even caused a major fire in the port. Despite Israel claiming that the strikes were carried out to prevent Hezbollah from shipping Iranian weapons to Lebanon, Russia condemned the strikes. Not only did Moscow express “deep concern” about Israeli strikes, it also said that represent a “crude violation of Syria’s sovereignty.” Furthermore, Russia stated that it “opposes” Israel’s actions and called on the Israeli government to “refrain” from conducting airstrikes in Syria, which has been interpreted as a warning that Moscow will not hesitate to act if its interests in Syria are compromised.
In fact, Russia’s recent decision to increase its military presence in Syria and conduct joint drills with Syrian troops could signal Moscow’s rising intolerance for Israeli airstrikes that target Russian interests. Earlier this month, Russia sent warplanes to the Khmeimim airbase in Syria and immediately afterwards, Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu visited Damascus and met with Assad. Moscow also conducted naval drills in the Mediterranean and launched air exercises along with Syrian forces.
In this respect, Russia’s criticism of Israeli strikes and its public display of military support for the Assad regime does not bode well for Israel, as it threatens to upend Israeli dominance over Syria’s skies. Until now, Russia has not used the S-400 missile system against Israeli jets, even though Moscow has installed the advanced system in its military bases in Syria. Moreover, Russia has thus far refused to sell the S-400 batteries to Iran. Israel remains strongly opposed to the sale of the system to Iran, as such a move could prevent the Israeli air force from carrying out strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities.
Russia’s furious reaction has undoubtedly set off alarm bells in Israel and according to reports, the government is scrambling to reduce tensions from escalating, with Israeli military officials holding talks with their Russian counterparts to try to calm nerves. This perhaps explains why Israel has not been forthcoming in its friendship with Ukraine in this time of need, as it is no doubt keen on not riling Russia further, particularly given that Israel’s primary concern, apart from its conflict with Palestine, is Iran and its affiliates. Successfully thwarting these threats requires an amicable relationship with Russia, particularly in Syria.
All things considered, Israel’s refusal to publicly back Ukraine is a perfect example of the realist dogma that national interests and security issues trump all other concerns and “friendships.” Israel has repeatedly stated that the activities of the Iranian regime are a “national security concern” and that conducting airstrikes against Iranian proxies in Syria is crucial in preventing Tehran from establishing a major presence near Israel’s borders. Therefore, regardless of the strong bilateral ties between Israel and Ukraine, Israel will continue to act in a manner consistent with its security goals, which, in the case of Syria, includes acceding to certain Russian demands in return for Moscow turning a blind eye to Israel’s operations.
Russia’s Preeminence in Syria Means Israel Will Not Help Ukraine
Israel is unlikely to back Ukraine given that it depends on Russia's approval for conducting airstrikes in Syria against Iranian proxies.
February 23, 2022
Israeli PM Naftali Bennett (L) meets with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi, Russia, Oct 22, 2021. IMAGE SOURCE: KOBI GIDEON/GPO