On February 29, 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed a “historic” agreement to bring peace to Afghanistan after almost two decades of conflict. For most people familiar with the region and its tumultuous history, the news provided no particular relief. They knew that any real chance for peace and reconciliation in the country could not be based on a hasty “deal” that essentially signaled American conflict fatigue and failure, and which primarily relied on the Taliban to honor their commitments.
For US President Donald Trump, however, securing this deal was essential, regardless of its substance. On the surface, which is often all that counts, it gave him a foreign policy win, and the chance to boast about delivering on a major campaign promise as he seeks re-election in November. Unfortunately–and unsurprisingly–major fault lines of the agreement are already being exposed. Violence by the Taliban has continued unabated, and a new report submitted by the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team for Afghanistan to the UN Security Council claims that the senior leadership of al-Qaeda and some 400-600 of its operatives are active in the country, and that relations between the group and Taliban “remain close”. This of course means that the Taliban has failed to fulfill one of the key tenets of the agreement–to sever ties with al-Qaeda.
Also read: The US-Afghan “Peace” Accord: What Happens Next?
This goes directly against what the Trump administration promised the American people and lawmakers. Speaking to CBS News just one day after the signing, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made the bold claim that the Taliban had “made the break” from their “historic ally”. When the US waged its war against terrorism in Afghanistan in 2001, the aim was to eliminate the al-Qaeda threat from the country after the group killed more than 3,000 US citizens in the September 11 attacks. The February peace accord also rests on the “commitment” that the Taliban will fight militant groups–including al-Qaeda–and prevent them from staging attacks on America from Afghan soil. However, the UN report states that the two groups consulted with each other throughout the Taliban’s peace-talks with US officials–which lasted 16 months. During these consultations, the Taliban assured al-Qaeda’s leadership that they would “honour their historical ties” to the group.
The UN’s findings cast a shadow on an already fragile deal, with experts questioning the Taliban’s intent to hold up its end of the bargain. As the agreement currently stands, the US has made specific and measurable commitments relating to troop withdrawal and related diplomatic and legal obligations. The Taliban, on the other hand, has not. Nothing that they have agreed to–be it their intent to engage in talks with the Afghan government or broader agreements to reduce violence in the country and engage in counterterrorism measures–is measurable, or enforceable. The vagueness of the language not only leaves America with no measure to monitor the group’s compliance, but, according to UN experts, also allows for “differences in interpretations of the agreement”, which they say will be difficult to resolve.
The prisoner-exchange for example, which calls for the release of up to 5,000 Taliban prisoners by the Afghan government in exchange for up to 1,000 Afghan security forces held prisoner by the Taliban, has been a point of contention between the two parties right from the start. The UN report outlines concerns by the Afghan authorities to release so many prisoners at once, fearing an uptick in violence. It also states that the Taliban most likely did not hold as many as 1,000 Afghan forces as prisoners, and therefore abducted many citizens and government officials to boost numbers for the exchange.
When Afghan President Ashraf Ghani rejected the timeline for the prisoner swap, he said that it was a promise the United States could not make, as key issues regarding the Taliban had to be considered first. This is understandable, because if the Taliban are certain that they can take over by force, which, according to the UN report, they are, then prisoner releases should only be undertaken if and after the Taliban makes satisfactory concessions, and not be enforced as a precondition. As the US races to withdraw its troops from the country, the report’s authors claim that it could push the Taliban to delay talks until then, so it could increase pressure on and threaten the Afghan government to surrender to its demands. These demands include delisting all its members from the UN Sanctions list, which has been met with strong resistance from the Afghan leadership, as they want to retain leverage to persuade the Taliban to negotiate.
The Taliban has come out and rejected the report’s conclusions. Speaking to TIME, the group’s spokesman, Suhail Shaheen, said it consisted of “baseless accusations aimed at spoiling the peace process”, referring to claims about the Taliban’s ties with al-Qaeda. “We are fully committed to the agreement and the obligations therein– not to allow anyone to use the soil of Afghanistan against any other country,” he added.
After the report was published, US Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad focused on defending the agreement. He described the Taliban’s split with al-Qaeda as a work in progress that could slow down US troop withdrawals, but said that, despite challenges, progress has been made. Though the administration has said that the withdrawal would be “conditions-based”, there is no denying that the US has sped up its plan. According to Reuters, at the end of May, the number of troops stood at roughly 8,600, down from 13,000 in February. Officials claimed that the swift drawdown was due to heightened COVID-19 concerns. The New York Times also reported on options being considered within the White House regarding the timeline for troop withdrawal. One proposal involves a complete withdrawal of American soldiers by November, which could be Trump’s preferred option, if he thinks it could bolster his election campaign.
Ultimately, that is all Trump is concerned about–reelection. Not lasting peace and not self-governance. However, a rushed withdrawal from the country while underplaying the relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda could push the status-quo back to the years before 9/11. The UN report says that the Taliban remains committed to reinstalling a harsh form for Islamic rule in the country. There have been mounting concerns about the status of women and girls in the nation after the US’ departure. Experts familiar with the region have also emphasized that the Taliban have done nothing to prove that they can be trusted to protect US interests after the withdrawal.
However, none of that seems to matter to the Trump administration–especially not in the face of an upcoming election in November. Trump is already facing overwhelming challenges at home, with raging health and socio-political crises. So, if he thinks that ending (read: walking away from) an “endless war” and bringing home troops will afford him any positive reactions from his fan base and beyond, he will consider it. Unfortunately, for a president who loves to focus on optics, as Wilson Center’s Paul Kugelman rightly said: “If the U.S. simply shrugs off the Taliban's continued ties to the very terror group that US forces entered Afghanistan to eliminate nearly 19 years ago, then you’d have some really bad optics to say the least”.
Image Source: Vox