In the early hours of February 1, Myanmar’s fragile experiment with democracy came to an unceremonious and abrupt end. On the day the country’s newly elected parliament was due to be sworn in for its five-year term, the Burmese military (also known as the Tatmadaw) seized power in a coup d’état, swiftly detaining State Counsellor and de-facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other prominent lawmakers from the ruling National League for Democracy (NLD) and placing them under house arrest.
Simultaneously, soldiers also rounded up several pro-democracy activists and critics of the military and temporarily severed cell phone and Internet connections in the capital cities of Naypyidaw and Yangon. In the midst of this crackdown, the Tatmadaw then announced that it was imposing a year-long state of emergency, and transferring legislative, executive, and judicial powers into the hands of the army chief, Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing.
Myanmar’s constitution allows for the military to take over in case of any circumstances that “may disintegrate the Union or disintegrate national solidarity or that may cause the loss of sovereignty,” and the army baselessly alleged that widespread voter fraud in the November general elections—in which Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD secured a stunning victory—threatened the country’s democracy and needed immediate attention. Promising to investigate and resolve the matter during the emergency period, the Tatmadaw declared that new elections would be held in 2022 and that it would relinquish power to the winning party of the vote.
While the putsch has undoubtedly crushed hopes for democratisation in Myanmar in the near future, an examination of the country’s history and tense power dynamics between civilian and military rule over the years suggests that such a goal was perhaps unrealistic from the start. The country has bounced back and forth between the two forms of governance since 1948, and even though Aung San Suu Kyi has come out as a dominant force of democracy during this time, the Tatmadaw has always remained the country’s most powerful institution.
After decades of crippling economic and political isolation, though the Burmese military took some modest steps towards establishing a more democratic system in 2008, it did so whilst consistently dictating the limits of democracy it would be willing to tolerate. Southeast Asian military and democratisation expert Darin Self calls such a form of government a “bounded democracy,” one that functions at the behest of the junta, most commonly manoeuvred “by engineering formal rules through the constitution that either curb the influence of the opposition or boost the power of the military’s allies”.
This is directly applicable to the case of Myanmar. The Tatmadaw-drafted constitution of 2008 was explicitly designed to protect the military’s interests and powers and guarantees the body an unelected quota of 25% of seats in the legislature, and control of the defence, interior, and border ministries, basically giving it veto power in case of any amendments to the law. The text also bars the junta’s biggest nemesis, Aung San Suu Kyi, from ever serving as president of the country, on the basis of her marriage to a foreign citizen. These safeguards allowed the Tatmadaw to embark on this so-called transition to democracy, leaving the running of the day-to-day aspects of the country to the civilian government—which opened the country’s doors to the West and rest of the world—while never really ceding its power and authority.
However, what the Tatmadaw perhaps underestimated, was the remarkable endurance of Aung San Suu Kyi’s popularity which, despite a few hiccups along the way, has remained a strong counterweight to the military. Much to the junta’s great dismay, she was even able to circumvent the constitution and create the position of State Counsellor to serve as the de facto leader of the country, making her more influential than the generals ever intended her to be. The magnitude of her acceptance was significantly felt in the November vote, wherein the NLD won 83% of the available seats. Simultaneously, the Tatmadaw’s proxy political party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), failed to gain traction with the public (and dimmed the junta’s hopes of building a real political competitor to the NLD), winning an abysmal 7% of contested parliamentary seats in the 2020 general election.
Although Aung San Suu Kyi stood by the military’s side, refusing to condemn their actions against the Rohingyas at the international level, the relationship between the two sides has significantly worsened since 2015 due to the NLD’s consecutive wins at the polls and its consistent efforts to amend the constitution to strip the junta’s unrestricted power. Though these attempts were blocked due to the Tatmadaw’s veto powers—some as recently as March last year—the November 2020 election seemingly gave the NLD the people’s overwhelming support to continue pursuing constitutional reforms, which may have been a breaking point for the military, making it realise that this quasi-democratic form of government was no longer serving its interests.
Also read: Can Myanmar Authorities Really Be Held Accountable for Their Treatment of the Rohingyas?
Many have nevertheless expressed puzzlement over the Tatmadaw’s actions to upend a status quo it created for itself, as they have not only brought long-standing internal tensions to a sudden head but are also sure to result in extensive economic sanctions and isolation from the rest of the world. Given the prevailing constitutional safeguards, it is unclear how much the NLD would have actually been able to threaten the military’s agenda, even in the face of a resounding electoral win. However, to see such widespread rejection of an institution so deeply embedded in the country’s political history—and one that military leaders consider to be extremely respected and beloved—may have led to the armed forces to act out in revenge and frustration. Some observers have even pointed to Gen. Min Aung Hlaing’s own political goals, as he aimed for the presidency following his retirement from the armed forces. However, the USDP’s less than flattering performance in the 2020 polls put those ambitions out of reach. “There was a feeling that the government and Aung San Suu Kyi violated the constitution and weaponised the military’s own constitution against them,” Yangon-based analyst Richard Horsey told CNN.
What happens next, is anybody’s guess. Though it is unclear what will happen after the stipulated 12-month emergency period, it is not a stretch to say that the Tatmadaw will find a way to stay in power beyond that. In the meantime, protesters have defied the junta’s ban on public gatherings, and have taken to the streets to voice opposition against the coup, demanding the restoration of the civilian government and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other NLD party members who have been charged with violating obscure laws in an attempt to justify their detention. While international condemnations and punitive measures are sure to follow, Burmese military leaders have shown resilience to such tactics in the past, and they are unlikely to persuade the Tatmadaw to change course. It’s worth noting that Gen. Min Aung Hlaing is already under US sanctions for directing the brutal crackdown in Rakhine state against the Rohingyas.
Also read: The Misunderstood Logic and Role of Sanctions in International Diplomacy
Any additional punishment by the international community will also be considered carefully due to fears of pushing Myanmar further into the arms of China, who has thus far deferred making any comments on the coup and blocked the UN Security Council’s efforts to condemn it. The military hardly cares about the will and well-being of the Burmese people, and it will patiently weather any harsh actions against it, as it has before, regardless of their consequences on the country’s citizens. The nation is already in the throes of a struggling economy, the COVID-19 pandemic, and a conflict involving dozens of armed ethnic groups. A political crisis of this magnitude is only going to make things more complicated. “The doors just opened to a very different future,” prominent Myanmar historian Thant Myint-U wrote on Twitter on February 1, adding, “I have a sinking feeling that no one will really be able to control what comes next.”