The Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) seeks to harness artificial intelligence in a transformative movement towards automation by boosting social and economic growth, reducing our decision-making to algorithms, and restructuring work systems, labour markets, and societal structures world over.
However, where does this leave Africa, which is still coming to grips with the innovations of the third industrial revolution?
At the World Economic Forum (WEF) meet last month in Cape Town, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa welcomed the onset of the 4IR as an answer to the many urgent issues afflicting the continent.
From revolutionizing the healthcare service delivery system to scaling up productivity, the possibilities created by 4IR in mainland Africa are endless. Yet, sub-Saharan Africa poses a unique set of challenges which draw into question the universal viability of 4IR.
The agricultural sector is still the primary employment sector in the continent, employing 54% of the total working population. In this respect, there is a fear that the advent of the 4IR in driving agricultural mechanization through the use of automation and robots could lead to a significant decline in employment, forcing many to move to cities in lieu of better opportunities.
True mechanization in the agricultural sector has not been possible due to an inefficient commodity supply chain which creates a reluctance to adopt new technologies. This fear of a loss of income can be mitigated through the use of technology which records the sale and distribution of products, and tackles the mistrust of farmers through more rigorous bookkeeping. Once this is achieved, the mechanization of the sector can occur in a more sustained and profitable manner and enable farmers to more efficiently sell their produce in local and international markets.
Alongside the fact that the majority of the continent is employed in the agricultural sector, much of the sub-Saharan population–particularly women–rely on the informal sector, which contributes nearly 41% of the region’s total GDP. This is largely comprised of micro-level and small-scale ventures like cottage industries, food-selling, and small agro-processing businesses.
Even in South Africa, nearly 30% of all economic activity is informal; this figure rises to 60% in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.
Hence, 4IR would result in a drastic shift in the regulation of the informal sector and its integration into the mainstream economy. This would be incredibly difficult as the undocumented nature of the sector has already contributed to poor revenue mobilization efforts led by governments in many countries. It can be said that information, communications, and technology come in to fill these gaps, but widespread corruption furthered by the lack of skilled labour makes this transition even more challenging.
According to the International Labour Organization, the unemployment rate in the sub-Saharan region is only around 6%–but this is because most available work is low-skilled or unskilled, partly due to the region’s lack of access to higher education. So while most Africans are gainfully employed, more than 70% have an occupational vulnerability, which is far higher than the global average of 46%. This also means that the number of people skilled enough to work with and embrace the technologies of the 4IR is disproportionately low.
Therefore, while 4IR could strengthen sub-Saharan Africa’s ability to achieve widespread industrialization, the region’s readiness for the movement is questionable. Rampant red-tapism and corruption in governments as well as poor policy implementation is at the core of Africa’s industrialization problem and the biggest impediment to its economic growth.
Kingsley Moghaly, former Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, believes that African leaders should “reject the misleading notion that they can join the West by becoming post-industrial societies without having first been industrial ones.”
Rwanda, Ethiopia and Tanzania have proved, to some extent, that Africa can be industrialized. All three countries have implemented policies favouring homegrown manufacturing industries and have centralized the management and regulation of economic activity. Under what many experts have called a “developmental state model”, these countries have also adopted investor-friendly policies. Most importantly, the state ownership of such policies has led to a decrease in corruption in Rwanda and Ethiopia.
By adapting and replicating these models of infrastructural development across the continent–in conjunction with an overhaul of education policies–it is possible to produce skilled labour, and consequently facilitate a smoother transition into 4IR.
With China’s support and large-scale financing of infrastructural development projects across the continent, policymakers should also look at creating more partnerships with countries like India for support with assembly and agro-processing, skills development, technology, and healthcare by way of partnerships and joint ventures.
Pushing forward the African Continental Free Trade Agreement would remove tariff and other trade barriers and encourage other foreign players to invest in the region. This could also act as a check on China’s commercial expansionism and exploitation of natural resources from the region.
Lastly, most countries, including South Africa, currently do not have laws that fully address cybersecurity threats and the abuse of big data. It is absolutely necessary that these checks are implemented before allowing the large-scale influx of cyber networks and big tech in general society, as digitization without adequate security infrastructure can put these countries in an extremely vulnerable position.
Therefore, before embracing a shift to 4IR, African leaders must set policies which address corruption and cybercrime, boost skills development, and increase international trade. It is only by setting these systems in place that 4IR can be a successful and sustainable movement in Africa.
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Image Source: Africa Future Tech & Energy Summit