The ongoing clashes between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces in the contested breakaway enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh region (NKR)—or Artsakh—make for a highly complicated issue. The South Caucasus neighbours have been locked in this ethnic dispute ever since the fall of the Soviet Union, with Armenians taking control and establishing a de-facto government in the region and a few surrounding districts closer to Azerbaijan. Today, both sides finally agreed to peace talks mediated by Moscow. However, Russia has so far tread the grounds to mediation very carefully due to the complex web surrounding its strategic interests in the region.
The two states first clashed in a bloody war between 1992 and 1994, and then again for a brief period in 2016, despite efforts by foreign actors to mediate negotiations. With skirmishes this year resuming in July and escalating significantly over the past few weeks, the threat of another war is looming. In this vein, several analysts from the West, especially in Washington, have argued that Russia must assume its “natural” role as a mediator. However, with geopolitical realities complicating the Kremlin’s interference in the matter, Moscow may not wish to—and may not be suited to—single-handedly host talks between the two sides.
In the past, international efforts seeking rapprochement between the two sides by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)’s Minsk Group—which is co-chaired by the United States, France, and Russia—as well as mediatory efforts by other third-party actors like Iran have been unable to solve the conflict. It appears to be near impossible to solve a conflict that is so deeply rooted in ethnic tensions, where claims to NKR are intrinsic to the national identities of both sides. For Armenia, especially after its 2018 revolution, the protection of ethnic Armenians in Artsakh has taken on new importance.
Further, power relations and security interests between the parties involved in the conflict and those constituting the Minsk Group have changed over the years. For example, Russia and the US’ tumultuous relationship has led to Washington distancing itself from the process, while France’s recent statements on the alleged involvement of “jihadi” fighters from the Azerbaijan side have led Azeri to believe that Paris no longer maintains a neutral stance. Iran, who has maintained a cautious relationship with both sides and has stepped away from its earlier quest to protect Azerbaijan’s 83% Shi’ite population and increase its regional influence, this week lodged formal protests against both countries after shells from the fighting landed in its territory, causing damage to Iranian land and property.
Russia, on the other hand, has had relative success in mediating between Baku and Yerevan. In 1994, and then again in 2016, it was pressure from Moscow that prevented bloody clashes from continuing. Proximity and historical allegiances form a major basis of Russia’s interests in the region; it also shares strategically important ties with both former Soviet states. Yerevan is Moscow’s military ally by way of membership in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Although Azerbaijan does not have a similar security agreement with Russia, it is a major trade partner for Russia in terms of weapons sales and energy deals. These deals have forced the Kremlin to be neutral so as to ensure its regional dominance and military superiority, especially in Azerbaijan, where Turkey has been enthusiastic to fill the void for defence support.
In fact, the current conflict in the NKR cannot be disentangled from the larger hostilities between Ankara and Moscow, who are also engaged in proxy battles in Libya and Syria. Reports have shown that Turkey has not only deployed foreign-built military combat equipment to Azeri troops but has also deployed Syrian mercenaries to fight in the conflict. Ankara’s direct involvement in the conflict risks endangering Russia’s neutral status, as Moscow’s foreign interventions in other battles are centred around countering Turkish power.
Further, the Kremlin has been deeply involved not just in the Middle East but also in its neighbourhood. With proxy forces in Ukraine and its emergency support to Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Russia may already have its plate full. President Vladimir Putin’s newly extended stay in office is potentially under threat due to public discontent over his alleged involvement in poisoning his political rival, and his administration’s handling of the pandemic. Therefore, the Russian leader is no doubt aware that he must tread carefully before jumping into yet another military conflict in order to preserve his teetering public image.
Furthermore, unlike in the Donbas or Abkhazia, Russia’s mediatory role in the NKR conflict is positively supported by the European Union and the US, as well as the two parties involved in the conflict. Although the option of picking a side remains firmly off the table, Moscow is nonetheless reticent to invest capital into a seemingly irreconcilable negotiation to keep its partnerships with both countries alive. The Kremlin’s reluctance to publicly speak on the issue despite having backdoor conversations with both involved parties, and silence on the part of the US, suggest that the Minsk Group is likely to not be taken seriously by either side in any upcoming discussions and that the Putin regime is biding time to navigate its position.
Russia’s unique position as an ally to both countries means that any stance it takes could jeopardize its ties with the other, as both Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev vie for Putin’s support. Analysts have long pointed out that Pashinyan, who rose to power in 2018 after a pro-Russian government was overthrown in a coup, is not Putin’s ideal choice for an Armenian leader, despite his careful attempts at appeasing the Kremlin by way of military exercises and continuing to allow Russia to access its large military base in the country. On the other hand, Aliyev’s closeness with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has also not gone down well with the Russian President, for whom Turkish presence in Central Asia is a major security threat. Against this backdrop, it seems uncertain what Putin will do next, especially as he has openly stated that Russia’s CSTO obligations to Armenia—which Pashinyan has been pinning his hopes on—do not apply to the NKR, as the clashes “are not taking place on Armenian territory.”
Earlier this month, the presidents of Russia, France, and the US issued a joint statement condemning the escalating violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the statement, they called for an immediate ceasefire and resumption of talks between the two sides without any preconditions. The statement came soon after Aliyev and Pashinyan rejected an initial Russian attempt at holding negotiations, with both sides citing that it was too early on in the middle of active clashes to be entering any talks. This bought Moscow more time to plan its next move and assert its position as a neutral mediator.
Matthew Bryza, a former US ambassador to Azerbaijan and the ex-co-chair of the Minsk Group, said, “In my book, Russia has no interest in getting involved militarily in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It wants to be seen as an impartial mediator […] at the end of all this, I think what Moscow really wants is to have Azerbaijan agree to peacekeepers -- Russian peacekeepers -- which will give Russia a chance in the years and decades to come to exert much more influence in the entire region.” Yet, Russia’s passivity and failure to adequately counter Turkey’s military intervention and support Armenia more vocally has led to international speculation that Putin may be rethinking his options at maximizing the Kremlin’s influence and power over Yerevan by playing a more long-term game and withholding critical support at a crucial time.
Without active support from Washington, where leaders do not seem very interested in the conflict, Russia risks sharply polarizing the two neighbours and stirring further anger from Turkey, the EU, and the US if it makes any sudden and unilateral moves in the region, threatening its position as an unbiased mediator to the conflict. On the other hand, if the talks fail, it may also risk losing confidence from all parties involved and meet the same fate. Although the US does not have any direct interests in safeguarding regional security in the South Caucasus and despite some analysts arguing that the involvement of the Trump administration may complicate matters further, it is also becoming increasingly obvious that Russia’s calculated approach has allowed the NKR to see widespread damage to life and property. If not the US or France, whose stance on the issue has antagonized Azeri leadership enough for it to call for Paris’ removal from the Minsk Group, other concerned European countries must work together to create a new and unbiased body to assist Russia in its efforts, which should ideally end in a plebiscite vote for the people of the NKR to decide whether they wish to align with Armenia or Azerbaijan, or maintain autonomy.
Is it Prudent for Russia to Mediate the Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict Alone?
The Kremlin has to balance its act between appeasing both its strategic allies and countering Turkey’s rising regional influence.
October 9, 2020
Ousted President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan, former Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in October 2010. SOURCE: OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA