Ameya Pratap Singh interviews Dr. Kyle Gardner about the larger historical and theoretical dimensions of the border dispute between India and China.
Dr. Gardner is a non-resident scholar at the Sigur Centre of the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University, and also an associate at McLarty Associates, which is an organization that specializes in private-sector diplomacy.
A: In your upcoming book with Cambridge University Press, titled “The Frontier Complex”, you argue that British colonial border-making practices, such as the invention of the watershed principle, are at the very heart of the origins of geo-politics in the Himalayas. Can you shed some light on why British cartographers drew territorial borders as they did? What were their motives? And, how did these practices transform the politics of border regions such as Ladakh and Tibet?
KG: Yes, there’s a lot to unpack here in this question. So, I think probably it makes sense to break it into three parts: the origins of geopolitics; the border-making rationales that the British employed, or attempted to employ; and how these practices and emerging understandings of geopolitics affected Ladakh and Tibet.
‘Geopolitics’ is a term that, these days, is often used interchangeably with sort of global politics, or politics on a very large scale. But the term originally had a more precise meaning and one that was tied to the development of imperial geography of the 19th Century. The term itself was coined by Rudolph Kjellén, a Swedish political scientist in 1899, but really reflected developments that were decades in the making. Geopolitics refers to the causal relationship between geography and politics, and this is really reflected in the trends across the 19th century of imperial states using geographical theories and surveying practices and cartography as tools for mastering the territory that they sought to control. And, this was, in some ways, also reflective the emerging Westphalian notion of territory, which stipulates that one’s territory ends at a line, at which point another’s territory begins. However, at the time, this was not the way much of the world was territorially conceived of, as it was a new decidedly European imperial way of utilizing supposedly precise geographical features to help render onto maps the unambiguous assertions of territorial limits.
Getting to the second part of your question, British surveyors and cartographers really focused on an emerging hierarchy of boundary-making objects, which was reflected in what is referred to as the scientific frontier, or the strategic frontier. This idea really sought to bring together scientific precision, in the form of surveying, with strategic strength. There is no better object than, in the hierarchy of British boundary-making objects that emerged through the work of experts like Thomas Holdich, and to a letter extent Henry McMahon and others, than the mountain range. But, even more precise than that was the limit of the watershed, which united both the emerging sense of systems of water and the mountain ranges that were perceived to be the linear extremes of these drainage basins. So, by the second half of the 19th Century, particularly in Ladakh and the Western Himalaya, you have the limit of the Indus watershed being consistently thought of as the ideal boundary object. It was just a matter of the British surveyors the native surveyors, who did much of legwork, going out and precisely rendering those points and those lines through trigonometric surveying and then plotting those on a map. They could then use these maps to show other empires exactly which lines they claimed. But, of course, the geography was a little more complicated than that, and it turns out that, in the case of the Western end of the Himalayas, there is not a neat line that coincides with the watershed. You actually have 150 miles of dense complex mountain range that doesn’t necessarily give you a clear line, which is further complicated by the fact that this is an arid, high desert. This is the place of the famously, the Aksai Chin, which Jawaharlal Nehru referred to as a place where “not even a blade of grass grows”. So, this is really a space that was complicated by its geography and confounded all of these supposedly precise rationales that the British used.
Now, to get to the last part of your question, in terms of where Tibet and Ladakh fit in, both were polities that didn’t really map neatly onto maps. And, I say that because, while there were long-standing notions of border points, they mark a series of long-standing border points, mostly at passes and places along trade routes. However, Ladakh is surrounded by mountains with limited accessibility, and the notion that you really need a linear bounding of that territory is somewhat ridiculous. The only way you can get into Ladakh, and incidentally, the name itself means the “land of passes”, is through very particular points. This goes for Tibet as well, to a large degree. In such a scenario, all you really needed was to have a border point. So, when the British came along and assumed that this would be a straightforward exercise, but found that there weren’t any historical lines that they could draw upon, which really complicated things. Therefore, in some ways, the historical cases of Ladakh and Tibet really reflect their incongruity with the modern world system. They lagged behind, in some sense, this bordering of the world that was taking place, largely through the European, and to a lesser extent the American, expansion in the 19th Century. Hence, the 20th Century political challenges that Tibet and Ladakh posed, certainly to a larger extent Tibet, were really also the result of this historical baggage.
A: Moving onwards to the 20th Century, one of the most hotly contested historical events with respect to the Sino-Indian frontier was the signing of the Simla agreement between British India, Nationalist China, and Tibet in 1914. Can you speak to what was going on at the time? Why did the British feel the need to formally delineate the border, when they were famously proud of having ambiguous borders where they could have overlapping claims and exercise their control as and when they wished? They also underwrote Tibetan autonomy, while simultaneously accepting Chinese sovereignty. So, what was going on during the signing of the Simla agreement?
KG: The short answer is that Britain wanted a buffer state, much like it had already achieved with Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan. Tibet and the new republic of China wanted international recognition of some form. The British stressed at the Simla conference that their recognition of the newly formed Republic of China was predicated on China’s acceptance of Tibetan autonomy. However, what was going on behind the scenes was that the Tibetan representative, Paljor Dorje, who was sort of the Prime Minister of Tibet, was able to exercise a surprising degree of leverage over the British early on. And so, initially, the British attempted to get all the parties involved, particularly China, to acknowledge a degree of autonomy for Tibet that would allow Britain to basically be assured that there was no kind of undue influence of China in Lhasa. But, what really happened was a kind of revised version of this that called for the bifurcation of Tibet into inner and outer Tibet. This, of course, was absolutely anathema to the Chinese position on it.
And, more importantly, China never actually approved the treaty. So, the Simla Agreement is, in some ways, a pseudo-treaty. It was eventually, in 1936 or so, added to Aitchison’s treaties, the handbook of all treaties, coerced or not, but its inclusion was a result of an ex post facto reconsideration of the treaty negotiations that basically said, “China initialed the draft but then repudiated it when the plenipotentiary got back to Beijing. Why don’t we sort of take what we can get from this and say, ‘Okay lets’ sort of agree with Tibet and say that there is a high degree of autonomy.’” So, there is a certain sense that the Simla agreement was the continuation of the British-forward policy, which was incidentally inherited by India in 1947, and part of a general attempt to get a buffer state, and when the Chinese representatives came back to McMahon (who was the British plenipotentiary and the ring leader of the conference), the Tibetans brought a vast array of historical documents, census reports, and boundary pillars stretching back to the Tibetan empire in the 9th Century or so.
The Chinese claim, somewhat ironically, was really an echo of the argument that the British had used so many times, which rested really on two features. The first is effective occupation, which was sort of an international legal concept that said basically “we’re here, it’s ours”, which was a term that really developed in tandem with European expansion since the late 15th Century was articulated by the first international legal theorists; it basically says “possession is nine-tenths of the law”. Basically, if you hold it, you own it. The second feature is of continuity of states, which we see being articulated by the British in terms of a lot of their treaty obligations. In the case of the Simla agreement, however, this practice was adopted by the Chinese, wherein they said that the republic of China inherited the territorial claims and rights that the Qing empire had, and that includes Tibet. So, in some ways, the Chinese claims were interesting as they were using the British forms of claims, but it was also, more broadly, this moment where the British were kind of taking advantage of the continued de facto independence of Tibet that was both increasingly evident throughout the 19th Century with the weakening of the Qing Empire and the relative weakness of the Republic of China as a new, independent political entity that was craving international recognition. And so, at that moment, in some sense, Tibet had a real outsized degree of leverage that it really never regained at any other moment.
A: That’s quite interesting. It seems like British India was trying to leverage its own power at the time to get what it wanted in terms of demarcating the border, but we still had these two other actors: China which was interestingly using the legal language of the British; and Tibet also playing on its own autonomy that it enjoyed at the time, to exact concessions. That brings me to one of the more vexing questions that the Indian government was faced with in the late 1940s, which was whether Tibet should be recognized as independent. And, this happens even before the transfer of power, when Tibet started to assert its independence as it began to feel that the British were about to leave India. But, what does the historical record actually tell us about the legitimacy of Tibet’s claim for self-determination and independence? And, if these claims are in fact legitimate, should India now revise its acceptance of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, and play what many commentators refer to as the ‘Tibet Card’?
KG: India inherited a lot of diplomatic baggage at the time of independence. I think it’s worth reflecting on just all of the diplomatic complexities that were going on. You have the integration of some 560 princely states that are dealing with a complex diplomatic history. You have these buffer states, like Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan. You have an incredible array of political entities that need to be reconfigured in terms of their international and domestic relations.
With the Tibetan case, I often harken back to this book titled, rather ironically, “When Was Wales?”, which deals with nationalism and Welsh history in the context of Britain. And, the title, in some ways, mocks the one-dimensional nature of nationalism. We are, in some ways, seeing this echoed in Trumpian rhetoric in the US. “Make America Great Again.” What is that referencing? What is that “again”? But, taking the rhetoric seriously, there’s this notion that the problem of claims to national identity is that they exist in time, that states ebb and flow especially when boundaries aren’t fixed, and political power rises and falls in many cases—especially in cases like Tibet which is very sparsely populated, geographically challenging terrain that enjoyed a high degree of political independence at one point. So, to think about what China’s historical claim to Tibet would require retroactively applying that modern state geopolitical paradigm retroactively. This also gets back to the problem that empires’ power-relations, both internally and externally, are not really configured in this Westphalian state model paradigm, because you’re dealing with relations that are imbalanced in terms of power dynamics. For instance, Tibet was, at one point in time, an empire. Yet, at another point in time, it was part of the Yuan dynasty that was itself ruled by Mongols, a non-Han ethnicity that controlled China, much in the way that the Qing empire, Manchus of a non-Han ethnicity, controlled China in a particular political territorial configuration.
Therefore. historical claims really rest on either the selectivity of which historical period they chose, or else an acceptance of a certain kind of international relations realism paradigm that says that “If China has the power to basically assert this, and if India doesn’t dispute it, then it’s so.”
So, to answer your question with a non-answer, I think historical claims to self-determination are very tricky and, in some ways, it’s a question that has to be dealt with on a moral register not a historical register, even when, as in the case of the Simla conference, both sides bring very different arguments to the table. The Tibetan plenipotentiary brought a case of a significant set of historical documents that showed that Tibet was effectively a politically independent entity for much of its existence. On the other hand, China brought the argument—which was, in some ways, favored by the British—of effective occupation, saying that the Qing Empire exerted sovereignty over Tibet for quite some time, which it contended should be taken into consideration, in line with the emerging rules in international order that effective occupation and continuity of states ought to be taken seriously. However, equally, the Tibetans could counter and say, “Maybe we were effectively occupied 150 years ago, but 50 years ago we were effectively on our own.” And this kind of debate continues in the decades after Simla, too. So, the Chinese representatives in Lhasa are often side-lined or kicked out. So, I think historical claims to independence are, in some ways, only as strong as the political and moral authority that exists at the time that the historical claims are being made.
A: I empathize with the non-answer because it is a peered history that is so dynamic and in flux; the notion of sovereignty is constantly changing. For example, the Japanese challenged the Chinese in Manchuria, saying they didn’t have effective control, and therefore, their imperial conquest was legitimate. It’s just unfortunate that the Tibetans are unable to capture that moment of transition between the nationalists and the communists. And, even after the communists invaded, they made an effort for UN representation, but it didn’t quite work out. I guess outside of whatever historical period suits political expediency, it’s difficult to make a claim to statehood if you can’t enforce it.
KG: Just as a follow-up to that comment, I think there is a tragedy here, given that, at a time when so much of the world is seeing decolonization and the fruits of claims of self-determination, the claims of some people, like the Palestinians, the Kashmiris, and Native Americans aren’t taken as seriously. This discrepancy is largely the result of where the power lies. Hence, at a time when we are really seeing the world expanding into would-be ‘somewhat’ self-determined states, and the break-up of empires, that obviously isn’t the case in some areas. Indeed, there are also differing levels of self-determination and of political coercion that are always at play, as seen in the case of Nehru sending the army to Hyderabad.
A: A common theme that has emerged so far in our conversation is that border claims on both the Indian and Chinese side have an imperial history. That raises its own complications, because if the very nature of the border claims is based on imperialism and colonialism, then how can their relative acceptability be argued bilaterally and to domestic and international audiences? And that in itself raises its own set of complications for resolution. For instance, the Indian side, I am guessing, based on my reading of the historical record, does adopt a lot of the language that British India used to enforce its border claims. Similarly, the Chinese rely on their own imperial history to do the same. In such a scenario, how does a compromise really emerge? Does it need a very transactional ‘give and take’ mentality as Zhou Enlai proposed to Nehru in 1960, where you leave history and tradition aside and just look at strategic concerns and sort it out? How do we navigate this difficult historical terrain?
KG: I think in some ways I would reiterate the point that claims to history are fraught with complications. As much as many people like to say “history tells us” or “history teaches us”, it is often still a matter of how events or claims are interpreted in the present. Politics, as you pointed out in your question, is largely about ‘give and take’ and about the needs of the present, so I think India and China both make claims, and this sort of predates both the current pollical entities—the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China. Both India and China have made claims about effective occupation and about the continuity of states, as we discussed, and I think there are limits to what the practicalities of international relations can do with history without overly instrumentalizing it.
The point underscored by the divergent border claims is that the reason that standoffs between India and China reoccur with such cyclical frequency is that there isn’t a border, at least not one that is clearly demarcated (even though there are claims to lots of lines). And, you are absolutely right to point of that the source of this problem is imperial and so if the British Empire still existed, it could be hauled into international court. But, that is, of course, an absurd counterfactual.
The great challenge here has to do with what India and China’s long-term interests are. I think it’s fair to say that, of the two countries, China has been more guilty of obfuscating its intentions and delaying any attempt to resolve the dispute for strategic purposes and political expediency. Given that the border remains an issue of such indeterminacy, it really remains an open question that if the political will is there on both sides, or if the political pressures are exerted on both sides, this could be resolved. And, it could be resolved through a de facto standoff, wherein neither side is happy, which is the very definition of a compromise. If India were to accept China’s claim to the Aksai Chin, and China were to accept India’s claim to Arunachal Pradesh, then, in some sense, the path to a clear border demarcation could be clearly delineated.
The historical claims to both sides to both of those territories are ambiguous. I think the irony is that, in some ways, I have to be careful in saying this, there may be a slightly stronger case for India’s claim to Aksai Chin, but there may be also a slightly stronger case on the Chinese side to Arunachal Pradesh, or at least some bit of it (e.g. the Tawang track). Maybe in accepting the other side’s (India over Aksai Chin, and China over parts of Arunachal Pradesh) claims, both countries can call it a day and demarcate that. Of course, that is probably too much to ask from two very nationalist governments that are very committed to territorial integrity.
The difference between an empire and nation-state is that an empire can tolerate a degree of ambiguity along its borders. A nation-state really can’t. A nation-state’s borders are of existential importance; these are borders where blood is spilled. I think the song that Lata Mangeshkar sang to Nehru on Republic Day in 1963, “Ae Mere Watan Ke Logon”, this patriotic song of soldiers laying down their lives on the border and spilling blood on the border to sort of consecrate it. In other words, nation-state borders are sacred things, and that adds a layer of complication to boundary issues that empires didn’t have to deal with.
A: So, I guess the joint historical investigation in the aftermath of the 1960s talks was doomed from the beginning as it sought to look to history for answers. But, since you are in Washington, it’s only fair to ask you, where does the Sino-Indian frontier fit into US calculations, with respect to perhaps its own intensifying rivalry with China? President Trump of the cuff offered to mediate, and it was rejected by both India and China. Where does the US stand in the dispute? I don’t think that’s quite clear. Does it support India’s border claims? Where do you think the Quad collective is on the situation as well? Do you think the Quad would aid India’s position militarily if the border situation with China escalated? Perhaps by ratcheting up tensions in the South China Sea?
KG: I can only speculate on the position of the US government, but it seems fairly clear based on statements that have come out from the State Department and from officials with the National Security Council over recent months, but also over many years, that the US is behind India. I think it is fair to say that American support for India has only strengthened as its own relations with China have further deteriorated. On the topic of border claims, the US government has wisely refrained from weighing on the particulars, which I think it rightly sees as a bilateral issue. Off the top of my head, I can’t think of a particular statement that has come out recently that would publicly acknowledge India’s Line of Actual Control (LAC), for instance. However, that’s also acknowledging that the LAC—and maybe the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) officials may not go so far as to say this—is only a line in so far as it is a generally accepted de facto settlement area where the stand-off is. In the precise sense of the term, there is no border here. So, I think the US government has refrained from commenting on what it sees as a bilateral issue. That being said, there is no question of US support for India, particularly in light of what is rightly being seen by both the US and the Quad as Chinese aggression that is part of a broader assertiveness throughout the region. Therefore, despite its historically non-aligned position, India is seeing overtures of support from these strategic partners, whether it is the Quad multilaterally, or the US bilaterally.
A: Well that brings us to the end of our interview. Thank you for your time Dr. Gardner. I highly recommend your book to our readers, who can also find links to Dr. Gardner’s other articles on our website. Thank you for your time.
KG: Thank you for having me! It’s been a pleasure.
You can buy the Frontier Complex at: https://www.amazon.com/Frontier-Complex-Geopolitics-India-China-1846-1962/dp/1108840590
Dr. Kyle Gardner's other works are:
“Moving watersheds, borderless maps, and imperial geography in India’s northwestern Himalaya.” The Historical Journal [available online; issue forthcoming]
“Elphinstone, Geography, and the Specter of Afghanistan in the Himalaya” in Shah Mahmoud Hanifi, ed., Mountstuart Elphinstone in South Asia: Pioneer of British Colonial Rule (Oxford University Press, Fall 2018).
“The Ready Materials for Another World: Frontier, Security, and the Hindustan-Tibet Road in the 19th century Northwestern Himalaya.” Himalaya, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies 33: No. 1 (2014): 71-84.