The US-brokered Abraham Accords, which have facilitated the establishment of formal diplomatic ties between Israel and several Arab states, have been hailed as a “historic breakthrough” by the Trump administration. Although the Arab states initially had misgivings about a deal that ostensibly weakened their support for the Palestinian cause, they eventually signed on due to the promise of diplomatic and economic concessions from Washington, alongside crucial arms deals. In the hopes of widening the reach of this ground-breaking deal across the Islamic world, the US recently offered Indonesia, which is home to the world’s largest Muslim population, up to $2 billion in development aid if it joined the Accords. However, Jakarta has thus far rejected these significant rewards. What stops Indonesia from taking the deal and how can the US get Indonesia back to the negotiating table?
Given that both Indonesia and Palestine’s populations are predominantly Sunni Muslim, the inextricability of their ties and Jakarta’s support for the Palestinian cause is a given, and has fomented a strong popular distrust of and anger towards Israel, which has continued to annex swathes of Palestinian land and enact indiscriminate violence on the Palestinian people.
Thus, when false rumours spread about Indonesia taking the deal, President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo quickly rubbished them and also went a step further to assure the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, that even though a slew of Arab countries had turned their back on Palestine, Jakarta would not be following suit. Moreover, the Indonesian leader renewed his support for a two-state solution to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. “Despite the rapid changes in the Middle East, Indonesia will not take any steps to normalise with Israel until a permanent and comprehensive peace is achieved between the Palestinians and the Israelis,” Widodo told Abbas in a teleconference. Furthermore, Indonesia has been outspoken in accusing the US of a “blind” Israel bias and said that the deals have “encouraged” further Israeli violations and exacerbated the debilitation of the Palestinian cause. Furthermore, on a domestic front, Jakarta has said that normalising relations with Tel Aviv would be “against the Indonesian Constitution” itself.
Aside from its enduring friendship with Palestine and constitutional impediments, signing a normalisation deal with Israel also risks invoking the wrath of many radical Islamic groups within Indonesia, like Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. In fact, the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), the nation’s highest clerical body, stated that Indonesia “must remain consistent in its identity as a nation that rejects colonizers.” These groups have a significant influence on popular sentiments, as seen in 2018, when protests broke out in Jakarta following the Trump administration’s decision to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and then once again when Washington announced that it was relocating its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Therefore, the risk of popular outrage and the damage it could do to the government’s legitimacy, credibility, popularity, and power are simply too large for Jakarta to consider joining the Abraham Accords.
Moreover, Indonesian policymakers likely view this risk as unnecessary, given that Indonesia already enjoys a wide bilateral relationship with Israel even in the absence of such a deal. It is difficult to ascertain the true level of trade between the two countries, given that much of it is re-routed through third parties like Singapore, Jordan, and American holdings of Israeli companies. However, data released by the Indonesian trade ministry shows that the total two-way trade volume between the two countries was roughly $500 million in 2016, with palm oil being the leading export item to Israel. Further, an Israel-Indonesia Chamber of Commerce was established in Tel Aviv in 2009, indicating the level of importance both countries assign to their trade relations with one another.
Tourism also accounts for a significant portion of interaction between the two countries, with 36,300 Christian Indonesian tourists flying to Jerusalem for religious purposes in 2019. According to data presented by Israel’s Tourism Ministry, among all nationalities, Indonesian tourists are the biggest spenders on average in Israel, spending around US$310 a day, excluding airfare. Likewise, Indonesia is also a popular tourist destination for many Israeli backpackers.
With respect to the defence sector, Israel sold arms to Indonesia in the 1970s and 1980s, while Indonesian soldiers have previously received artillery radar and land surveillance training in Israel. While no official figures or details are available on these interactions, reports suggest that, under the presidency of Suharto, Indonesia “found it useful to conduct unofficial dealings with Israel, most significantly in the area of military hardware” and sharing intelligence on global Communist terrorist groups. Military and intelligence channels were also opened unofficially through Iran and Turkey in 1968.
Given the extent of these economic and defence ties even without formal diplomatic ties in place, there is little reason for Jakarta to risk inflaming domestic sentiments.
However, the risk of popular outrage is not unique to Indonesia and featured in the calculations of all the Arab states that signed the Washington-brokered deal. In fact, all the states share close ties with Palestine and have historically voiced their unwavering support for the Palestinian cause. Yet, the allure of concessions and rewards from Washington simply proved too great: Morocco won recognition of its occupation of the Western Sahara, the UAE signed a deal for advanced fighter jets and drones, Sudan was removed from the US’ State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) list and offered debt relief and financial and food aid, and Bahrain expected to receive F- 35 stealth fighters.
However, unlike these Arab states, Indonesia is not situated in a volatile geographic region like the Middle East, where diplomacy has been fragile and such a peace accord is deemed necessary for the stability of the region itself. Unlike the Gulf states who now view Iran as a bigger enemy than Israel, Indonesia is not under pressure to use Israel as a counter to any specific regional threat. Neither is it struggling economically, like Sudan, to the point that it will be enticed solely by economic offerings. Nor is it indirectly pressured by regional powers, like Bahrain was by Saudi Arabia, to sign such an agreement. Moreover, Indonesia does not have a significant Jewish population to appease as Morocco does.
There is also a growing influence of radical Islamic groups in the country that threatens to hold the country’s political system hostage. For example, after Joko Widodo won the 2017election, his opponent, Prabowo Subianto, who formed close ties with the radical Muslim sect, declared the election fraudulent, resulting in widespread riots; 6 people were killed and 700 were injured. Simultaneously, domestic terrorism is also on the rise.
Finally, there is no confirmation as of now whether the Joe Biden administration will honour these deals or keep the $2 billion aid offer to Indonesia on the table. This transition period in the US government has bought Indonesia time to see how this change in government affects the Abraham Accords as well as ascertain whether the signatory parties are accruing benefits that could not be possible without signing the deal and whether these gains outweigh the risks of signing the deal.
By playing the waiting game, Indonesia also stands to receive a revised and more enticing offer from the US, who is clearly keen to bring Jakarta on board. In fact, Indonesia’s strategy appears quite similar to that of Saudi Arabia, who, while pushing regional allies like Bahrain to sign the deal out of deference to the US, has continued to maintain a non-committal stance. Saudi Arabia has already indicated that it is open to recognising Israel and also gave its approval to the Trump administration’s decision to move the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Therefore, it gradually appears to be moving towards rapprochement with Israel and is likely waiting on a better deal from the US, possibly one that includes greater concessions for its ally Palestine.
Accordingly, Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff of the Nanyang Technological University argues that Indonesia “would likely require a deal that would grant strategic political, economic or military advantage which would not only appease nationalists but also be worth the trouble with Islamist groups”. In fact, Indonesian defence minister Prabowo Subianto has recently travelled to several countries in hopes of procuring advanced weapons systems to complete the modernisation of Indonesia’s military.
Hence, Othman Alkaff argues that Indonesia must use this unique opportunity to invite the US to offer military equipment, alongside “doctrinal development, personnel management and broader strategic planning systems”. Aside from bolstering Indonesia’s defences, it would also reduce Jakarta’s dependence on Beijing, which has become all the more necessary in light of China’s repeated aggressions in and ventures into Indonesia exclusive economic zone (EEZ). This could also pave the way for Indonesia to secure vaccine access as well as foreign investment.
Washington’s decision to extend Indonesia’s Generalized System of Preference (GSP) status in October, as a result of which there will be no duties on thousands of Indonesian exports, certainly appears to be a step in this direction. Furthermore, it is expected that the Biden administration will seek to expand trade and military agreements across the region. But, Jakarta evidently desires much more than these initial offerings.
As of now, it is difficult to speculate on what specifically the US must offer to bring Indonesia on board. However, what is clear is that, at least in the short term, Jokowi’s administration will function without hiccups by continuing its tried and tested formula of maintaining distant but mutually beneficial economic and political interactions with Israel. By not signing the deal just yet, Indonesia can continue to walk the tightrope between Israel, Palestine, the US, and its own Islamic groups without significantly upsetting the balance. Meanwhile, it can continue to hold negotiations in the background, like Saudi Arabia, so that it can secure more gains for itself and as well as Palestine.
Indonesia is Unlikely to Join the Abraham Accords. For Now.
Indonesia’s challenges are different from the Gulf and it stands to gain more by not signing the US-brokered normalisation deal with Israel.
January 27, 2021
Protesters in Jakarta hold signs during a rally to condemn President Donald Trumps’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. SOURCE: REUTERS