The historic rivalries between the Arab, Persian, and Ottoman empires are resurfacing, with Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey all vying for dominance in the Middle East. The United States (US)-led peace agreement between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to normalize diplomatic relations with one another last week came as a sudden—yet unsurprising—development in the region’s polarized relations. And, as these changes occur, India may find itself at an advantage if it continues to play its cards correctly in the region.
The normalization of relations between the UAE and Israel marks a clear recognition that the national interests of the centre-aligned Arab Gulf and the Jewish state are finally converging. While the Palestine issue has been at the core of preventing these alliances, it seems that the states are now willing to set it aside and cooperate to prevent Iran or Turkey from establishing hegemony over the region. Israel, which perceives an existential threat from Tehran and is becoming increasingly wary of its former friend Turkey, has also claimed to have pulled back from its promise of unilaterally annexing parts of occupied West Bank territory as a precursor to its deal with the UAE. Some experts believe that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu never planned to go ahead with the annexation plans and allege that this was a ‘diplomatic coup’ since the plan never had any map, timetable, or parliamentary proposal, and was easily swept away by a ‘temporary suspension’.
Therefore, warming relations with Arab powers now mean that Israel has an incentive to limit its territorial ambitions, especially if it wishes to gain brownie points with the Saudis, who have clearly signalled that they are willing to negotiate if Israel abandons its annexation plans. That being said, while the Palestinian Authority has vehemently rejected the new deal and labelled it as treacherous, the Arab countries may stand to have more negotiating power in favour of Palestinian interests if they open diplomatic missions in the Israeli capital.
The ‘triangular’ realignment of the region is dependent on how Riyadh, the de facto leader of the Sunni world, treads in its relationship with Israel, as it faces scrutiny from Turkey and Malaysia, who seem to be colluding to dominate the Sunni Islamic narrative. Yet, the security situation in the Middle East is still heavily reliant on alliances with the US, China, and Russia, especially as Washington takes hard-lined positions towards Beijing and Tehran and imposes sanctions on those engaging with the two states. For Ankara and Tehran, a non-Arab bloc backed by Moscow and Beijing seems to be a clear way forward in advancing their roles in the region, especially to dominate over the US-backed Saudis.
However, in the major ongoing regional conflicts, all of these polarities become more complicated. Even though Turkey is Russia’s largest trading partner in the Middle East, the two countries provide military support to opposing parties of the Syrian conflict. Simultaneously, Turkey dominates military support to the UN-recognized government in Libya, while rebel forces are backed by the UAE and Egypt. In Yemen, the Saudi-led coalition and Iran continue their proxy war, but the UAE finds itself backing a separatist power previously a part of the anti-Houthi camp. The normalization of Emirati ties with Israel in tandem with Saudi Arabia’s reluctance to follow suit, therefore, adds another layer of confusion about intra-Gulf relations and alliances as well, especially since Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are economic competitors.
Turkish leader President Recep Tayyip Erdogan seems to have used these inconsistencies as an opportunity to work on his country’s ambitions of dethroning the Arabs in becoming a regional power and has thus also begun to support the Iranian cause. Most notably, this June, the two countries held a joint military exercise in Kurdistan. Ankara has emerged as a key player in the Middle East, with ample military presence in Libya, Syria, and Iraq, and has also distanced itself from Western and European powers over its unilateral moves in the Eastern Mediterranean and its museum-renaming spree. In the Arab Gulf, the only country with which Ankara shares a strong strategic relationship is Qatar, mainly due to its estrangement from Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the aftermath of the 2017 Gulf blockade. Moving further from the region, Turkey has also made significant inroads with Azerbaijan and Pakistan, increasing its reach to Islamic states outside the region to expand its influence.
In all this, India’s newest foe, Beijing, has continued to maintain strong ties with all involved actors due to its purchasing power, investments, and arms exports. For New Delhi, the China-Iran security and economic deal in particular, which assures Beijing access to the Islamic Republic’s energy reserves, threatens to endanger India’s Chabahar Port project. This development poses a new challenge for Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration, which is already staving off increased tensions with its nuclear-armed and allied neighbours at both its frontiers.
Pakistan itself is seeing growing hostility from Saudi Arabia and is now mainly reliant on China for economic, military, and security support. It is also attempting to join the Turkey-Malaysia alliance in an apparent bid to reclaim non-Arab leadership in the Islamic world. Ankara has also signalled its support for Islamabad on the Kashmir issue, majorly irking New Delhi as being the only Muslim country to question its ‘internal’ affairs. However, as C. Raja Mohan notes, this is nothing new in Pakistani foreign policy, as Islamabad has historically supported the narrative of a unified non-Arab Islamic alliance since the 1955 Baghdad Pact. Further, in 1985, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan also formed the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), to which they inducted Central Asian Republics after the fall of the Soviet Union. Therefore, it seems that Islamabad is shifting its alliance from the Arab Gulf countries who have financially supported the country for years so far. Rather, the new non-Arab bloc, backed by Moscow and Beijing, seems to be the way forward for Islamabad.
Hence, as India struggles with managing its neighbours as well as pressure from the US to act as a regional counter to China, it faces a new challenge to its longstanding non-alignment policy. So far, New Delhi’s cordial relations with the Arab Gulf countries and Modi’s strong friendship with Netanyahu have been fruitful for India’s military, energy, trade, and security interests. And while it has not, and cannot, invest as much as China, India is a crucial market for the region’s oil and gas and an extremely important source of manual labour. According to Narendra Taneja, chairman of the Independent Energy Policy Institute: “For Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran, it is about securing demand, where India comes in as a super-heavyweight.” While New Delhi seeks millions in investments from Riyadh towards its strategic petroleum reserves, Taneja notes that geostrategically it would be extremely beneficial for the Modi government to continue building non-partisan and special ties with both the Sunni and Shia powers, as protection for the country’s oil shipments can only take place through robust communication between oil and gas establishments and navies. “For us, it is important to remain actively engaged in shaping the Middle East in such a way that mutual interests of India and the region are robustly promoted,” he said.
Therefore, New Delhi must find a way to overlook the realignments in the region and continue to maintain the efforts it has been putting in over the past few years to strengthen its relations with Arab Gulf nations, Israel, and Iran simultaneously. Responding to the UAE-Israel deal, India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar said that the deal was a welcome move that could make way for direct talks for a two-state solution to the Palestinian issue, as well as open up “lots of opportunities” for New Delhi at a time when its ties with Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi too are expanding. “When two strategic friends come closer it opens up lots of opportunities,” he said.
With Turkey, however, India must navigate with caution and reassess its cordial foreign policy. The two countries have, for years, shared a favourable trade balance, with Erdogan insisting that the Modi administration increase its Turkish imports. However, India’s constant denial of Turkey’s request to share nuclear technology seems to have pushed Erdogan closer to Pakistan.
Domestic pressure to isolate Ankara due to its support for Islamabad may catch up soon, and the Modi government must be wary in how it amends its foreign policy towards the country. While nuclear information sharing will continue to be off the table, the Modi government must find ways to continue and develop its bilateral trade with Turkey so as to avoid a Chinese takeover of the country’s resources. Irking Erdogan could also have a negative effect on India’s relationship with Malaysia, an important player in the Indo-Pacific. Just as it continues to reap the benefits of simultaneously holding close ties with both the US and Russia, maintaining stable relations with all Middle Eastern actors would provide New Delhi with the ground that it needs to protect itself from—if not counter—the hegemonic Chinese threat.
See also:
Discerning India’s Approach to Multilateralism in a Time of Unilateralism
The Geopolitical Realities of the Gulf’s Nuclear Programs