Lithuania recently initiated a dispute with China after expressing its willingness to deepen diplomatic and trade ties with Taiwan. This combative measure by a small Baltic nation has pushed other European countries to follow suit and recognise Taiwan as an independent country and review trade relations with China over security concerns.
In August, Lithuania acceded to Taiwan’s request to open a diplomatic office in Vilnius. It also accepted a request to call the office the “Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania,” incensing China, which continues to refer to Taiwan as the Republic of China under its “One State” policy. In response, Beijing recalled its ambassador from Vilnius and ordered Lithuania to do the same. The incident was notable as it marked the first time that China has recalled an ambassador from the European Union (EU). China further retaliated by halting rail freight to the European nation and suspending the trading licenses of Lithuanian producers.
Vilnius, for its part, has insisted that it was not its intention to upset Beijing and has expressed interest in negotiating with China but has yet to show any signs of rapprochement or change its stance on Taiwan. On the contrary, a trade delegation led by the Taiwanese government will soon visit Lithuania, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic.
Moreover, last month, Lithuania urged government officials to dump Chinese phones following a government-led investigation into in-built censorship tools on Xiaomi phones, which are believed to blacklist specific search terms like “Democratic Movement,” “Free Tibet,” and “Long Live Taiwan’s Independence.” Xiaomi has denied these allegations and claimed that it does not censor to-and-fro communications between its users. China, too, has rejected the report and called it a “new trick by a small pawn in Washington’s anti-China agenda.” However, these claims contradict China’s history with censorship and state surveillance.
Furthermore, in May, Lithuania pulled out of the “17+1” (which is made up of 12 EU members and five European states who have expressed an interest in joining the bloc) mechanism launched in 2012 and pushed its Eastern European partners to adopt a stricter stance on the Uyghur situation. Minister of Foreign Affairs Gabrielius Landsbergis said that the mechanism does not fulfil its purpose and has fewer than expected benefits for the country. He also called on fellow Eastern European countries to abandon the 17+1 mechanism and instead adopt a 27+1 framework for more leverage in negotiations with Beijing.
The 17+1 mechanism forms part of China’s larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which serves as China’s gateway to Europe. By targeting strategically located and cash-strapped Eastern European nations (such as Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, and the Czech Republic), Beijing has expanded political and economic dominance in the region. Significant investments include coal-powered plants, mobile networks, and a high-speed railway connecting a China-controlled port in Piraeus, Greece to Central and Eastern Europe.
Like in other parts of the world, China has been accused of practising “debt-trap diplomacy,” wherein it provides loans through state-owned banks and later buys stakes in crucial infrastructure projects when these countries fail to repay their debt. These accusations have gained momentum in the bloc, as many EU members now view Chinese investment in Eastern Europe as a mechanism to divide the Union.
Against this backdrop, countries like Lithuania have been drawn towards the Western bloc, which is primarily led by the United States. This West has frequently taken a united stand against China on issues such as human rights, territorial disputes, and banning Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei from their 5G networks due to security concerns.
The risk of taking such bold steps is significantly more pronounced for small nations, which are more vulnerable to punitive economic measures such as sanctions. For example, in 2020, China had threatened Prague with retaliation when the Czech Senate President visited Taiwan. Lithuania, though, has remained resolute in the face of this pressure. The small, seemingly insignificant nation serves as a crucial transit corridor for carrying goods from China to Europe. As things stand, Lithuanian exports to mainland China amount to roughly $367 million, making it a crucial export market. Considering this dependency, Lithuania has pivoted towards the West to ensure that the risks it takes in its relationship with China are not fatal.
This bold approach appears to have inspired other nations in the region, with many Eastern European countries strengthening ties with Taiwan in recent months through vaccine diplomacy. In June, Lithuania announced that it would donate 20,000 vaccines to Taiwan. Subsequently, Slovakia and the Czech Republic also announced vaccine donations to Taiwan. Additionally, the Baltic nations—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—are close-knit politically, economically, and militarily with a shared history of Soviet oppression. These nations could next follow Lithuania's footsteps and abandon China's 17+1 mechanism to show solidarity with Lithuania. Furthermore, after China threatened Lithuania, the European Parliament adopted a report that urged the EU to strengthen political ties with Taiwan, illustrating the country’s growing diplomatic footprint, not just in Eastern Europe but across the continent.
Emerging tensions within the continent, among both small and large nations, show that trepidations about China run far deeper than Beijing is willing to admit. Given how so many countries are jumping ship at the first opportunity, this perhaps indicates how ties with China were merely a marriage of convenience rather than one of preference. The EU has traditionally maintained a measured stance on democracy and human rights in China so as to not endanger trade. Recently, however, it has taken a more aggressive approach, imposing sanctions and even withdrawing from trade deals.
The Lithuanian government has adapted its policy on China in line with this shifting European approach and some might even argue that the Baltic nation has been one of the driving forces behind this shift. The new government in Vilnius, which took office last December, has prioritised a values-based foreign policy that stresses on principles of anti-authoritarianism. In fact, Lithuania’s growing assertiveness and pivot to the West is evident not just in its evolving ties with China but also in how it has emphasised on the importance of NATO and trans-Atlantic solidarity. Lithuania has extended support to Ukraine against Russia by providing medical, military, and diplomatic support. It also gave political asylum to Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya after she was forced to live in exile due to the Lukashenko administration’s crackdown and imprisonment of dissidents. Taking all this into consideration, Lithuania appears to be leveraging its role as a “front-line state” and punching far above its weight, leading the way for many far richer and more powerful European countries, and inspiring other small Eastern European states to follow in its footsteps.
How is Lithuania Challenging China’s Expansion Plans in Eastern Europe?
Lithuania is leveraging its position as a front-line state and has emerged as one of the driving forces in a continent-wide pushback against China.
October 21, 2021
SOURCE: THE LITHUANIA TRIBUNE