Last month, Ukraine’s Foreign Minister (FM) Dmytro Kuleba warned that Russia will “soon reach the level of isolation” of North Korea, saying, “Russia has no more allies in the world, except for countries that depend on it financially and politically.” Since the onset of the country’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia has lost several allies and partners—both willing and unwilling—in the international community, with many severing and downgrading ties as well as making plans to completely wean themselves off of any sort of dependency on Moscow. Yet, while some countries have distanced themselves from Russia, others have used the war as an opportunity to either form a stronger alliance against the Western bloc or at the very least capitalise on the lucrative energy deals Russia is offering in the wake of escalating sanctions. While it is evident that Russia’s economy is feeling the pressure of sanctions, deteriorating foreign relations, and the pullout of several foreign companies from its soil, it is less clear if Russia is truly on the brink of isolation as Ukraine says and hopes.
In particular, the vilification of Russia has crystallised the formation of a rival axis of rogue nations such as Iran, Belarus, Venezuela, North Korea, Syria, Cuba, Uganda, and Eritrea, with Russia and China at the helm.
China has stood behind Russia at virtually every turn, abstaining from or voting against United Nations resolutions, deepening defence cooperation, and holding the United States (US) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) responsible for the Ukraine war while also seemingly denying allegations of Russian war crimes and echoing Moscow’s claims of Washington and Kyiv conspiring to conduct chemical warfare. Likewise, Russia has conducted joint air drills with China, become its biggest oil supplier, and more recently condemned US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s ‘provocative’ and “aggressive” visit to Taiwan.
Iran, too, has said that had Russia not “stopped” NATO in Ukraine, the alliance “would have launched the same war sometime later under the pretext of the Crimea issue.”
Russia has also counted on the support of longtime ally and neighbour Belarus. In fact, Belarus was used as a launching pad for the invasion of Ukraine and has since renounced its non-nuclear status to allow Russia to station nuclear weapons in the country and also said Russian troops can remain in Belarus indefinitely. In return, Putin has vowed to supply Minsk with nuclear-capable missiles, noting that “unprecedented political and social pressure” from the West is pushing Belarus to integrate more quickly with Russia.
Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, too, has strongly condemned the “destabilising activity” of the US and NATO and pledged his “full support” for Putin. In fact, Venezuela’s unwavering support for Putin has been on show for years now. For example, it backed the Kremlin in the 2008 Russo-Georgian war over South Ossetia. In return, Russia has sold hundreds of millions of dollars worth of arms and weaponry to the country and recently formalised various collaborative projects in energy, railway transport, civil aeronautics, military equipment, space technology, and pharmaceuticals.
Russia has also sought to deepen existing ties with smaller fringe nations such as Eritrea, which has been sanctioned and isolated for its role in the year-long war in neighbouring northern Ethiopia. It came as no surprise then, when in early March, Eritrea was among the few countries that supported Russia’s invasion during a United Nations (UN) General Assembly vote calling on Russia to end its invasion of Ukraine. The resolution was passed with an overwhelming majority, but it became clear which countries would stand by Russia no matter what. Soon after, Eritrean Foreign Minister (FM) Osman Saleh, made an official visit to Moscow. His Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov, in turn, voiced his support for a stable and secure Africa on the basis of the African Solutions to African Problems principle. Such engagements formed the basis for his Africa tour two weeks ago, during which he visited Uganda, Ethiopia, and the Republic of Congo.
Russia has also used such interactions to secure elusive international support for its territorial expansion plans, with both Syria and North Korea formally recognising the independence of the Russia-backed breakaway Ukrainian territories of Donetsk and Luhansk in the last two months. Similarly, Belarus, which did not offer official recognition to the territories, said it “respectfully” understands Russia’s decision.
The Kremlin sought to generate a greater pushback against Western sanctions as well. For instance, during a meeting in Caracas last month, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his Venezuelan counterpart Carlos Faría jointly condemned the US’ “illegal sanctions” on both their nations as “a flagrant theft” and a “brutal violation of their economic and social rights.” Similarly, Maduro has slammed the sanctions on Russia as “madness,” “a crime,” and “an economic war.”
Russia and Venezuela have also used their bonhomie to refute suggestions that their economies are reeling under the impact of these sanctions, both as a means to project their power and resilience but also as a means to engender solidarity among sanctioned nations, which have been forming closer economic and trade ties to counteract the “maximum pressure” strategy of the US and its allies. Lavrov and Faría, for instance, celebrated how both their countries' economies are “continuing forward” despite the US’ “unilateral coercive measures.”
For example, during Putin’s visit to Tehran, the Russian leader argued that Western sanctions have failed and proposed “ditching” the US dollar in their bilateral trade.
Furthermore, at the Arab League Council in Cairo last month, Lavrov vowed to expand Russia’s bilateral ties with all Arab countries, particularly in trade, energy, agricultural, and strategic ties.
Through such interactions, Russia has not only sought to ensure the survivability of its economy and support for its territorial ambitions but also maintain its global strategic footprint. For instance, after Israel condemned the Bucha massacre back in April, Russia swiftly joined hands with Turkey, Iran, and Syria to call for an end to Israeli airstrikes in Syria, breaking with its 2015 deal with Israel to coordinate airstrikes.
Evidence of Russia’s non-isolation is also seen in its continued diplomatic and trade ties with countries that are less willing to offer their explicit support for its war in Ukraine. For instance, India has readily accepted Russia’s offer of cheaper oil and in May imported 819,000 barrels per day (bpd), up from 33,000 bpd a year earlier, despite the continued threat of Western sanctions.
In fact, Russia has earned “unprecedented” and “record” levels of oil and gas revenue during the war, with revenue up by at least 50%. Furthermore, the ruble is reportedly the world’s best-performing currency and even countries who have denounced Russia’s invasion have agreed to pay for imports in rubles or at the very least opened accounts in Gazprombank. Deputy Russian Prime Minister Alexander Novak recently claimed that “about half” of state-owned energy giant Gazprom’s 54 foreign clients have opened ruble accounts. This list includes Germany, France, and Italy, all of which are vocal critics of the war and have even agreed to bloc-wide sanctions on Russia.
Yet despite these developments, the White House insisted that Putin’s recent trip to Tehran was a reflection of “the degree to which Mr. Putin and Russia are increasingly isolated.” “Now they have to turn to Iran for help,” spokesperson John Kirby said during a press conference.
Given that the European Union is nearing a 90% ban on all Russian oil imports and how it is generally accepted that the ruble’s startling performance is due to currency manipulation, there is a sense that Russia’s resilience in the face of mounting Western has been overstated. Moreover, it has been expelled from key international forums like the UN Human Rights Council and at least 400 Russian diplomats have been expelled from over 20 countries.
Furthermore, in a bid to ensure support for its own misadventures, Russia has also had to extend support to its allies and supporters to an unprecedented level, indicating the dwindling flexibility and independence of its foreign policy. For instance, it recently vetoed a resolution in the UN General Assembly to level new sanctions against North Korea, indicating that it is firmly against such measures and even calling for the sanctions to be lifted entirely. This is in sharp contrast to 2016, when Moscow voted in favour of a resolution to impose sanctions on Pyongyang despite simultaneously pursuing greater infrastructural ties with the rogue state.
This, however, seems like a small price to pay to ensure support for a war that has cost Russia up to $900 million a day, not even factoring in the damage caused by sanctions. Aside from continuing to collect hefty oil revenues and pushing its allies to echo its propaganda, Russia also continues to wield veto power in the UN Security Council.
Therefore, regardless of the damage caused by the war, it is clear that Russia is nowhere close to reaching the same level of isolation as North Korea. Much of this, of course, lies in its indispensability, both as an arms and energy supplier. If, however, countries begin to turn to alternative suppliers this situation could quickly change and create a seismic shift in the global geostrategic environment.
Has the Ukraine War Really Pushed Russia to the Brink of Isolation?
Despite mounting international criticism, economic repercussions, and deepening isolation from the world at large, Russia has shown no sign of bringing an end to the war.
August 4, 2022
IMAGE SOURCE: ATLANTIC COUNCIL