Since Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AK Parti) came to power, Ankara’s foreign policy has taken a sharp turn towards projecting the country’s influence overseas. While Turkey’s global reputation has taken a hit following the Erdoğan administration’s rising authoritarianism, support for the Muslim Brotherhood and neo-Ottoman ideals, and growing economic instability, it has also been successful in expanding its reach and exerting control over foreign populations in Libya and Syria. Simultaneously, to gain allies in an era of dwindling diplomatic relations for Turkey, Erdoğan has had to resort to soft power diplomacy—especially during the coronavirus pandemic—to secure its standing as a regional power.
In the aftermath of 9/11, Turkey became known for its unique ability to combine core tenets of liberal democracy with Islam, with European powers considering the country as a regional role model. This allowed Turkey to flourish as a soft power leader, especially in the Middle East, where it was expected to export its liberalized political ideals to conservative Islamic societies.
However, in the last decade, Ankara has increasingly embraced an aggressive combination of Islamism and hard power. This can be attributed to the national sentiment that followed the 2011 Arab Spring, where brute force, military power, and territorial border security concerns shaped both the internal and external developments in the country and its neighbourhood. Further, the “survival-first” mentality became more ingrained after the country’s July 2016 coup attempt, solidifying domestic support for a more hard-line government that operated using an approach of reviving Ottoman sentiments to gain power and support.
Simultaneously, the international system’s shift towards a multipolar environment, as well as the rise of non-Western societies in global politics, made for a smooth and gradual shift for Turkey to emerge as a leading military power in the region. For example, several Western countries dismantled defence systems deployed in Turkey and transferred them to NATO allies in Eastern Europe following the Arab Spring, allowing Ankara to strike an S-400 deal with Moscow instead, indicating a clear shift in its international alignments, irking Western powers.
Further, Turkish leaders are aware that nation-branding is essential for a country that is currently in the limelight for internal cultural and existential contradictions that do not necessarily align with the trajectory in which its Middle Eastern and European neighbours are moving. While other countries in the region are attempting to somewhat liberalize their conservative Islamic societies, Turkey seems to be moving in the opposite direction and distancing itself from the secular ideals that defined its cultural spirit since its nationhood. In this regard, too, Ankara has made significant overtures towards expanding its reach and alliances across the region at large.
For instance, the administration’s blatant support for the Muslim Brotherhood has gained immense resonance in Qatar, whose leaders have begun to help Turkey support the group’s activities. In fact, a Dutch parliamentary committee report highlighted Turkey’s reach among Muslim communities and revealed that the Turkish government had donated tens of millions of euros to mosques and Muslim organizations across the country. Terrorism expert Ronald Sandee has equated this funding to a “kind of soft power” exercised by Ankara over European Muslims, especially the large Turkish diaspora. Closer to home, Ankara and Doha’s glowing relationship has also translated to massive military support for the countries’ interventions in Libya and Syria, where they have emerged as major negotiating powers.
Even as Erdoğan struggles to keep the economy afloat in the face of the coronavirus pandemic, the Turkish government announced a series of medical aid drives to its neighbours, European powers, and Muslim allies in Central Asia. In particular, the country’s healthcare diplomacy in Kazakhstan received widespread coverage. This is because, in Central Asia, Turkey competes with China and Russia for regional and bilateral influence. This is despite the fact that almost all the other countries in Central Asia and the Caucuses are Muslim majority states with large numbers of Turkic language speakers.
In fact, Russia and China also sent tens of thousands in protective equipment to Almaty in July. During the pandemic, Ankara has used its cultural proximity to these countries to its advantage by providing aid to its “Turkic brotherhood”, thereby creating a strategic foothold through which it can enhance its reach to the economic and resource opportunities provided by the Far East.
Likewise, Turkey has also reiterated its historical brotherhood with support for Azerbaijan in the latter’s ongoing border dispute with Armenia at Nagorno-Karabakh, emerging as an assertive influencer in the South Caucasus. In return, Baku has spoken out against Greece and other European states that are against Ankara’s exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Turkey has also called upon popular culture to build its footprint across the region. For instance, the country’s superhit television show Ertugrul has emerged as an unlikely diplomatic tool, captivating Pakistani society and creating what writer Fatima Bhutto describes as a new identity shift of modern Pakistanis from being primarily consumers of Western media and towards narratives that have Islamic history at the centre. It is noteworthy that the show has been produced by a member of the AK Parti and created by an open supporter of Erdoğan’s government. In that vein, creator Mehmet Bozdag has claimed that not just Pakistan, but also Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and South African member of parliament Zwelivelile Mandela have visited the show’s set and posed for pictures. Bozdag claimed that Maduro even said that he was considering converting to Islam due to the show.
Now, while these last few claims are easily contestable, it is still interesting to see how a television series depicting the Ottoman Empire, a facet so crucial to the Turkish national imagination, has stirred pro-Turkish sentiments, particularly in Pakistan. This is especially crucial at a time when the country’s relations with Arab Gulf countries seem to be growing increasingly shaky. Pakistani audiences were so engrossed by the show that Turkey’s TRT World gifted the country broadcasting rights for free, where it was then translated to Urdu and broadcast on national television during Ramadan. Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan welcomed the Turkish present as a change from Bollywood and Hollywood imports. “We have a culture with romance and history, as well. However, it is also filled with Islamic values,” he said. Although Ankara has been bolstering its ties with Islamabad for quite some time now, the role of Ertugrul cannot be entirely dismissed, especially in light of Ankara’s growing vocal support for Pakistan in the Kashmir issue.
While this soft power projection has undoubtedly advanced Turkey’s international ambitions, Erdoğan is driven by an unmistakable desire to invoke nationalistic sentiment in order to retain support and legitimacy for his regime among his own citizens. Medical diplomacy and cultural exports have bought favour with foreign leaders and paved the way for Ankara’s brute force tactics in Syria, Libya, and the Eastern Mediterranean, which in turn appeases the Turkish populace by cementing Erdoğan’s ability to be both generous and strong. Consequently, Ankara’s medical aid operations, repatriation campaigns, and overseas military operations have successfully deflected attention from the on-ground reality of economic vulnerability by painting Erdoğan as a competent leader of an economically and politically sound nation.
Ultimately, while this may have consolidated Erdoğan’s power, Turkey’s soft power projection rests on shaky ground and alliances with countries on the verge of or in the throes of isolation. Its regional alliance with Iran, for instance, continues even in the face of UAE, Bahrain, and perhaps more Arab Gulf nations normalizing ties with Israel.
Nevertheless, through its attempts at soft power diplomacy, its bold move to turn the Hagia Sophia museum into a mosque, and the state media’s ability to propagate government agenda, the Erdoğan administration has been successful in crafting a national narrative that appeals to the people’s Ottoman hangover and their vision of Islamic benevolence.
From Ertugrul to COVID-19 Aid: How Has Erdoğan Wielded Soft Power for Domestic Gain?
In addition to its international interests, the incumbent Turkish administration has used soft power diplomacy to gain popular support.
September 18, 2020
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan leading prayers at Istanbul's newly-converted Hagia Sophia mosque, July 2020. SOURCE: MUSTAFA KAMACI/TURKISH PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SERVICE