On January 22, the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress passed the China Coast Guard (CCG) Law. The law, which took effect on February 1, militarised the CCG and brought it under the centralised command of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission. Further, it gives power to the CCG to use “all necessary means,” including the use of force, against foreign vessels that enter waters that Beijing deems to fall under its own territory. In addition, structures formed by other countries on its waters can also now be demolished by the CCG. Although most countries have laws that extend similar powers to their coast guard and the CCG law is nothing out of the ordinary in this sense, it has nonetheless raised alarm in the neighbourhood and internationally. Some countries, like the Philippines, have lodged formal protests with Beijing and have scaled up the presence of their defence vessels in the region. But are these fears valid or is the community exaggerating the threat posed by the new CCG Law?
Admittedly, several countries in the region with several overlapping territorial disputes have approved similar laws in the past. For example, in 2016, South Korea, who is embroiled in a dispute with China over the ownership of the Socotra Rock, authorised its maritime law enforcement personnel to use force, “including handguns and onboard cannons, against Chinese fishing vessels” found to be operating illegally in national waters, should the situation be flagged as threatening. Similarly, Vietnam, which disputes China’s claims to the Paracel and Spratly islands, passed a coast guard law in 2018 that grants “greater latitude” to use firearms at sea. In fact, militarising one’s maritime law enforcers is not unique to the region; Italy, France, and the United Kingdom (UK), for example, utilise their navy to perform coast guard duties.
Even Japan, whose coast guard (JCG) staff is prevented by Article 25 of Japan Coast Guard Act from “organising, training, or performing military functions as an army”, recently changed its interpretation of the law in response to the CCG law and increased Chinese incursions into Japanese territory. According to the updated interpretation, the JCG can now “directly fire” a weapon against foreign vessels that attempt to land on the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.
In this context, China would certainly be justified in defending the law as “normal legislative activity.” To this end, Wang Wenbin, the deputy press secretary of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said at a press conference in November that “the relevant contents of the draft are in line with international conventions and practices of many countries.”
However, closer inspection of the clauses and wording suggests otherwise. Despite China’s insistence on the controversial law’s legitimacy, the new wording indicates that the law differs not just from common state practices but also violates provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which China is a party.
Article 3 of the new law stipulates that the CCG must carry out law enforcement operations in the waters and airspace above the waters “under the jurisdiction of China”. However, this clause is deeply troubling for its many neighbours because China’s nine-dash line, which asserts “indisputable sovereignty” over waters and territories within this range, is based on historical claims that are inconsistent with China’s territories outlined in the UNCLOS. In 2016, China dismissed the South China Sea Arbitration Award that denied China’s historic claims and ruled that the claims were “incompatible with the Convention” and “exceed(s) the limits of China’s maritime zones as provided for by the Convention.” In addition, the CCG also permits the “deportation or forceful towing” of government and civilian vessels found within its waters, another clause that is non-compliant with international law.
Furthermore, before the new law was passed, the use of firearms by the CCG was guided by a series of other Chinese domestic laws that limited the use of weaponry to “subduing the other party”. Moreover, firearms could only be used after issuing a verbal warning to the threat. In contrast, Article 22 of the new CCG law promotes the more aggressive usage of arms, stating that when the sovereignty and jurisdiction of China are “confronted with an imminent danger of unlawful infringement” by foreign entities at sea, including civilian fishing vessels, the CCG is required to “take all necessary measures, including the use of weapons”, even “if there is no time for warning or if there is a risk of serious harm after giving (a) warning.” This goes against the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, which stipulates that “the use of weapons must not endanger human life.”
In addition, Article 25 of the law permits Beijing to create “temporary maritime alert zones” in “waters under the jurisdiction of China” and restrict or completely prohibit the passage of other vessels and personnel during “security missions,” while controlling “illegal criminal activities at sea,” dealing with “maritime collision incidents,” when it is important “to protect marine resources and the ecological environment” and when simply “otherwise necessary”. These provisions give Beijing a convenient pretence to restrict and control the movement of foreign vessels in disputed waters. While the UNCLOS does allow for the temporary suspension of “the innocent passage of foreign ships… without discrimination” in territorial seas “for the protection of [...] security”, there are well-founded suspicions that Article 25 can be used to abuse this provision.
Finally, although other countries also have similar laws in place, China’s assertion is more alarming given its military prowess. China’s annual defence budget is the second highest in the world (following the United States). Moreover, China has a much larger and far advanced arsenal at its immediate disposal compared to any of its maritime neighbours. For example, the JCG is “equipped with machine guns ranging from 12.7 mm to 40 mm in calibre”. In contrast, the CCG patrol boats are armed with destroyer-class 76 mm guns. Therefore, any further assertion of China’s military prowess are hugely disconcerting for countries that are involved in territorial disputes with the Asian superpower.
In the past, China has bullied and “shadowed” even civilian vessels of other countries. The passage of the new CCG law, however, now further empowers its vessels to stoke potentially violent encounters. Several countries have expressed deep concern regarding the law and rightly so. The decision of these countries to ramp up their own defence illustrates how the law has ushered in a paradigm shift across the Indo-Pacific, generating global concern about regional stability. Although China has argued that the military nature of the law only aims to “stabilise” a region that already faces intense conflict on a daily basis, Beijing’s newest law threatens to encourage further militarisation and make the Indio-Pacific an even more fertile breeding ground for frequent armed conflict.
Fear Around China’s New Coast Guard Law Is Legitimate. Here’s Why.
Although several countries have laws that authorise their guards at sea to use force, China’s new coast guard law is uniquely concerning.
March 19, 2021
SOURCE: GETTY IMAGES