In a sign of renewed hope, Lebanon’s new government, led by Najib Mikati, the country’s richest man, won a vote of confidence from the parliament last week. Yet, the path to winning the parliament’s confidence was not as smooth as expected; frequent power outages stalled the proceedings and when the session finally commenced, Speaker Nabih Berri asked Mikati to shorten his speech. This small seemingly trivial incident, though, is symptomatic of Lebanon’s larger economic and political crisis.
In 2019, Lebanon finally cracked under the pressure of decades of poor policies and after piling mountains of debt it accrued from the 1975-1990 civil war. The coronavirus pandemic then added to the country’s woes and it nosedived into further misery following the massive explosion at the Beirut port in August 2020, which resulted in over 200 deaths and almost $15 billion in economic losses.
The World Bank estimates that Lebanon’s GDP (per capita) contracted by a whopping 40% in 2020 and the situation has only worsened since then. Its foreign reserves have been running at dangerously low levels and the central bank recently announced that it was incapable of running Lebanon’s subsidy programme. Furthermore, the country is grappling with an unprecedented unemployment crisis, its inflation levels have soared, food stocks are close to being depleted, and there is a severe shortage of medicine and fuel.
The crisis has been further compounded by Lebanon’s messy political situation, which has been largely dysfunctional for over a year. Following mass protests over poor government policies and rampant corruption, former Prime Minister (PM) Saad Hariri tendered his resignation in October 2019. The event paved the way for a new government led by Hassan Diab, who also resigned in the aftermath of the Beirut explosion last year. Efforts to resuscitate a functioning government were unsuccessful for more than a year, and the lack of a clear authority figure to steer the country towards recovery has magnified its misery.
However, the recent formation of a government and the positive statements made by new PM Mikati have led to a sense of cautious optimism in Lebanon. Mikati has promised to bring in much-needed reforms, including addressing Lebanon’s corruption and resuming bailout talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which has promised to provide $1 billion in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).
Additionally, local, regional, and international actors have also taken steps to address the crisis. Earlier this month, the Lebanese Shia militant group Hezbollah facilitated the arrival of Iranian fuel to the fuel-starved country. Furthermore, Qatar has agreed to provide the Lebanese military with food aid and France has constantly supported the country, even raising millions in aid.
Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine Lebanon’s future changing for the better through government promises and goodwill gestures by internal and external actors, especially given Lebanon’s sectarian politics.
According to the National Pact of 1943, adopted after Lebanon gained independence from France the same year, the President will always be a Maronite Christian, and the posts of PM and Parliament Speaker are respectively reserved for Sunni and Shia Muslims. While the Pact was meant to unify Lebanon’s sects, it ended up dividing the country as religious groups fought for power, eventually leading to a brutal 15-year civil war from 1975-1990.
The war ended after all sides signed the Taif Agreement in 1989. Rather than eliminating the sectarian political structure, however, the Agreement further entrenched power-sharing among Lebanon’s various sects. This deal exacerbated sectarian divides and is at the root of Lebanon’s current problems, including its economic and political crisis.
For instance, since the end of the war, Hezbollah, which was founded in 1982, has been able to consolidate its position as the main representative of the country’s Shia minority and emerge as a major political force in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s rise was “assisted” by the Taif Agreement, which created sectarian pockets in the country and allowed for the growth of radical outfits.
Hezbollah today runs a parallel government, controlling a large part of Lebanon’s borders, especially with Syria, and uses the Beirut port to transport drugs and weapons with no state intervention. Furthermore, it exerts control over many politicians and heavily influences policy-making.
Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that Hezbollah brought Iranian fuel to Lebanon. While the event was celebrated widely, the Lebanese government said that its permission was not sought. PM Mikati even called it a “violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty.” According to experts, Hezbollah’s move was meant to project the group as Lebanon’s saviour and strengthen its grip on the country and has intensified existing sectarian divisions.
Lebanon’s sectarian politics have made it difficult for different parties to agree on policies and they have accused each other of catering to their bases and forming alliances with other sects to pursue their narrow interests. For instance, ex-PM Saad Hariri had accused President Michel Aoun of allying with Hezbollah to obtain a majority of cabinet seats.
This infighting was one of the reasons why the IMF ended bailout talks with Lebanon in 2020, citing a lack of commitment from politicians. “Every faction is vying for its own personal interests while the country burns,” a Lebanese source familiar with the IMF talks had told the media.
This increasing influence of Hezbollah has also strained Lebanon’s ties with Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, a major source of funding. Saudi Arabia, once a major player in Lebanon and one of the country’s main patrons, has been increasingly concerned about the Iran-backed group’s growing clout in Lebanon and has recently been indifferent to Lebanon’s situation.
Another legacy of Lebanon’s sectarian politics has been the surge of corrupt politicians. In the 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index, Lebanon was ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the world (149/180). Moreover, Lebanon’s power-sharing model has been labelled as a “system fuelled […] by the profits and corruption it facilitates.” The reservation of posts by sects has guaranteed positions to the powerful from their respective groups and has led them to indulge in corrupt practices and reckless mismanagement. Decades of pervasive corruption have not only been responsible for the Beirut port blast but also for stonewalling investigations regarding the origins of the explosion.
All things considered, Lebanon’s problem is not a lack of good intentions, which seem to be everywhere, but rather a scarcity of good policy-making, a problem intensified by its sectarian-based power-sharing model. With this model in place, Lebanon will struggle to find the light at the end of the tunnel and escape from its economic and political woes.
Despite Good Intentions, Lebanon’s Sectarian Politics Have Done More Harm Than Good
It is hard to imagine Lebanon’s future changing for the better by government promises and goodwill gestures, especially given Lebanon’s sectarian politics.
September 29, 2021
A protester stands with a Lebanese national flag during clashes with army and security forces near the Lebanese parliament headquarters in the center of Beirut on Aug. 4 SOURCE: AFP