On 11 December 2019, Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi stood before the International Court of Justice to defend her government against the accusations of genocide of the Rohingya people. At the hearing, Suu Kyi echoed the position taken by the Myanmar administration–that the state does not deny the violence taking place in Rakhine, but maintains that this is only in response to alleged attacks by Rohingya insurgents on the state and that no civilians have been harmed.
The United Nations has termed the actions of the Myanmar government as a ‘textbook example of ethnic cleansing’; human rights groups and international organizations have documented the state-led burning of villages, torture, mass murder, and rape for years now. The Rohingyas, an ethnic and religious minority group in Myanmar, are stateless in their home country and are systematically denied a dignified existence. This has forced them to seek refuge in neighbouring states.
In the face of these system-wide abuses of power, it becomes important to question Aung Suu Kyi’s role in the worsening of the crisis and tracing her evolution from a world-acclaimed democracy activist to the head of a state accused of and defending genocide.
Suu Kyi had been under house arrest for almost 15 years for resisting the country’s military dictatorship, and her father General Aung San, who is considered the “father of modern-day Myanmar”, was a part of the Burmese independence movement against the British. The anti-colonial resistance was largely driven by Burmese ethnic and Theravada Buddhist nationalism.
While this brand of nationalism was successful in liberating the country from its colonial rulers, Suu Kyi was indoctrinated into a system of Buddhist nationalism that operated at the expense of the country's Muslims. In 2015, her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), rejected all capable Muslim candidates in the election that brought her to power. It is therefore natural that most citizens who share the view that Myanmar should be governed as a Buddhist cultural state that excludes groups like the predominantly Muslim Rohingyas would support Suu Kyi.
Suu Kyi’s style of leadership right from the founding of NLD has been authoritative. She refuses to delegate even the smallest tasks to others, and there is a strong personality-focused approach to her politics. Yet, the Rohingyas had long placed their trust in Suu Kyi and her party. They had been campaigning for the NLD since the 1980s, believing that the nation’s transition to democracy would restore their rights as lawful citizens.
Under Suu Kyi’s leadership so far, however, the Rohingyas have been systematically denied citizenship, access to state education, or jobs in the civil service–in fact, the state does not even officially recognize the identity ‘Rohingya’ as an indigenous race. Rather, they are wrongly considered to be illegal migrants from Bangladesh and hence are termed as “Bengalis”.
When Suu Kyi took office in April 2016, she achieved in two years what the military had tried and failed to do for decades–drive away more than 700,000 Rohingyas from their homes into neighbouring countries. Press freedoms are at an all-time low, as illustrated by the 2017 arrests of Reuters journalists Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo for their coverage of military violence in Rakhine.
Many argue that Suu Kyi’s defined powers as State Counsellor prevent her from commanding over the still-dominant military, which in turn controls the ministries of home affairs, defence and border affairs. Any attempt by Suu Kyi to reduce the violence, therefore, would prompt strong reactions from military officials as well as the general public, most of whom oppose the Rohingyas’ claims to citizenship.
Supporters of Suu Kyi also argue that she cannot afford to antagonize the military that still holds major sway in the government and can upset the democratic arrangement at the centre. However, it is equally true that the military is unlikely to disturb the present system as it enjoys an advantageous situation of holding power without accountability–currently, it wields its power without checks and balances while Suu Kyi takes responsibility on its behalf.
While it is true that Suu Kyi has no control over the military, she has four civilian ministries under her supervision that are also involved in the repression: information, religious affairs, immigration and foreign affairs. Suu Kyi has failed to use these departments to alter public perception about the Rohingyas or even condemn the violence in Rakhine, thus raising more eyebrows regarding her personal stance towards the issue.
She has also chosen not to challenge the status quo of international organizations; they have limited access to Rakhine, and her administration does not allow humanitarian aid. Veteran US diplomat Bill Richardson has termed the international panel set up by Myanmar to address the issue–The Advisory Board for the Committee for Implementation of the Recommendations on Rakhine State–as a ‘whitewash’, and also accused Suu Kyi of ‘lacking moral leadership’.
Suu Kyi’s statement at her December ICJ hearing was welcomed by most people in Myanmar, while domestic issues of divisions in the NLD and a struggling economy have gone to the backburner. Her stand at the Court may also have boosted her prospects in the upcoming elections scheduled later this year.
While it is unlikely that the NLD would face significant losses in the 2020 elections, Suu Kyi has definitely lost her charm among voters belonging to Myanmar’s several other ethnic minorities. The West is also disappointed in Suu Kyi for not meeting the standards expected of a Nobel Peace Prize laureate. Her actions prove that democracy cannot be equated with liberalism. Democracy, for which she fought for 15 years, seems to apply only to ‘original’ citizens of Myanmar and not minorities who do not identify as ‘native’ Buddhists.
The ICJ on 23 January rejected Aung San Suu Kyi’s statements and ordered Naypyitaw to stop all forms of genocide against the Rohingyas. But such rulings have their limitations, and this makes the expectation of immediate change practically impossible. The international community must put pressure on the Myanmar government via international forums to reform its policies, accept the repatriation of Rohingyas, and provide them with basic rights and protections.
Reference List
BBC. (2018, January 25). How Aung San Suu Kyi sees the Rohingya crisis. BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42824778
Bowcott, O. (2019, December 11). Aung San Suu Kyi tells court: Myanmar genocide claims ‘factually misleading.’ The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/11/aung-san-suu-kyi-tells-icj-myanmar-genocide-claims-factually-misleading
Ellis-Petersen, H. (2018, November 23). From peace icon to pariah: Aung San Suu Kyi's fall from grace. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/23/aung-san-suu-kyi-fall-from-grace-myanmar
Hasan, M. (2019, August 24). It’s Time to Indict Aung San Suu Kyi for Genocide Against the Rohingya in Myanmar. The Intercept. Retrieved from https://theintercept.com/2019/08/24/aung-san-suu-kyi-rohingya-genocide/
Ibrahim, A. (2020, January 16). Myanmar Has Blazed a Path to Democracy Without Rights. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/16/myanmar-democracy-rohingya/
Simons, M., & Beech, H. (2019, December 11). Aung San Suu Kyi Defends Myanmar Against Rohingya Genocide Accusations. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/11/world/asia/aung-san-suu-kyi-rohingya-myanmar-genocide-hague.html
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