Since the military coup overthrew the democratically elected Aung San Suu Kyi government on February 1 and took control of Myanmar, several countries have issued sanctions against the authoritarian regime in an effort to preserve democracy. New Zealand, the United States (US), the European Union (EU), Canada, and the United Kingdom (UK) have all imposed punitive measures against the military junta by sanctioning individuals, freezing foreign assets, and calling out Commander-in-Chief General Min Aung Hlaing and his officials for their abuse of power. In contrast, India has only expressed “deep concern” about the events unfolding in Myanmar and has thus far refrained from taking action that affects diplomatic relations with its neighbour. However, what is the strategy that is guiding India’s silence on the continued atrocities taking place in Myanmar under the military junta?
Firstly, Myanmar is an integral part of India’s foreign policy because it lies at the intersection of India’s Act East Policy and Neighbourhood First Policy. It shares a 1,624 kilometres long land border with India in the northeast and a 725-kilometre maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal, thereby serving as a bridge to connect South Asia and Southeast Asia. As a testimony of its importance, Myanmar is the only Southeast Asian country that has a separate bureaucratic division (shared with Bangladesh) in India’s External Affairs Ministry, under the Narendra Modi government, so that special focus can be given to issues pertaining to the two neighbours.
In order to improve land connectivity and gain access to a wider market, India has invested in infrastructure development projects that will help boost trade in the India-ASEAN Free Trade Area. So far, India has extended a $1 billion line-of-credit towards India-ASEAN connectivity projects that include the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport (KMMTT), which are currently under construction. While the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway will connect Moreh, India with Mae Sot, Thailand via Myanmar, the KMMTT aims to connect India’s seaport of Kolkata with Myanmar’s Sittwe deep-water port in Rakhine state. The Sittwe port, which sits on the Bay of Bengal, serves as a “critical node” of the KMMTT, as it connects southwestern Myanmar to northeastern India by “creating a multi-modal trinary of sea, river and road transport corridor to boost interconnectivity”. In fact, India has also proposed extending the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway further to Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos.
In fact, India and China have both been simultaneously trying to cement their foothold in Myanmar’s Rakhine state in order to increase their presence in the Bay of Bengal. India’s long-term goal is to set up a special economic zone (SEZ) around the Sittwe port, which India helped to build and which is supposed to act as a counter to the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port project that China-funded through its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Therefore, it is no surprise that India sees Myanmar as a crucial partner in fulfilling the government’s ambition of becoming a $5 trillion economy by 2024. Bilateral trade currently stands at $2 billion; this is well below the volume of trade between Myanmar and China, which stands at $6.44 billion.
Aside from its economic objectives, India also intends to use Myanmar as a vehicle to strengthen its strategic influence in the region, as evidenced by the IMNEX-18, a joint bilateral naval exercise in 2018. India also invited the Myanmar Army to participate in the India-led multilateral Milan naval exercise that occurs biennially in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, with the next one taking place in March 2020.
Furthermore, it is key to India’s “Made in India” arms industry, and bought India’s first locally-produced anti-submarine torpedo in 2017, named the TAL Shyena. In 2019, Myanmar also acquired another diesel-electric “Kilo-class” submarine, the INS Sindhuvir, which was modernised by India after purchasing it from Russia in the 1980s. Other regional players like Bangladesh and Thailand have acquired submarines from China, indicating the stiff competition for arms trade in the region.
In addition, India needs the Tatmadaw to fight insurgents in the northeast. Vice versa, the Tatmadaw needs the Indian Army to fight the Arakan Army, which has at times crossed-over into Indian territory and challenged the Myanmar government’s control of the conflict-torn Rakhine state. For instance, two years ago India and Myanmar conducted the three-week-long coordinated “Operation Sunrise” in their respective border areas, which successfully targeted multiple border militant groups on both sides. India’s Home Ministry has reported an 80% drop in insurgent-related violence in the northeast, which has been attributed to the combined efforts of the Assam Rifles, the Indian Army, and the Tatmadaw. This security cooperation has knock-on benefits for the development of the KMMTT, whose construction has been interrupted by insurgent activity.
Building highway infrastructure will also facilitate religious tourism into the country. Myanmar is home to approximately 460 million Buddhists, who would no doubt welcome an accessible option to visit Bodh Gaya and other Buddhist sites in India. In fact, PM Modi’s “Buddhist Circuit” initiative seeks to double incoming foreign tourists and revenue by connecting ancient Buddhist heritage sites across different states in India. India currently sits well behind China, Japan, and ASEAN allies in terms of the value it provides to the Buddhist tourism sector and therefore aims to bridge this gap by adopting a policy of non-interference in Myanmar’s internal affairs.
Myanmar has also received 3.7 million doses of the India-manufactured COVID-19 vaccine, with roughly 1.7 million of these doses delivered as a grant from the Indian government. Despite several powerful world players imposing sanctions on Myanmar immediately following the coup, a Ministry of External Affairs’ briefing released on February 4 indicated that New Delhi would continue to supply COVID-19 assistance, including vaccines, to Myanmar. India is no doubt wary of the fact that Myanmar has also green-lighted vaccine deliveries from China, and is thus reluctant to cede the crucial diplomatic gains it has made during the ongoing pandemic.
Keeping all this in mind, Myanmar holds a unique and undeniable economic, strategic, and cultural value to India, and has therefore left policymakers in New Delhi thinking that taking a strong stance on the military coup could push Myanmar even closer to China. In fact, since the coup last month, Beijing has used its veto power at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and prevented the Council from releasing a joint statement condemning the coup on the grounds that what is happening in the country is its “internal affairs”. China has also previously protected Myanmar from criticism at the UN over its crackdown on the Rohingya Muslims.
While India joined the international consensus on condemning the coup on February 1, it made sure to clarify that it was not in support of “coercive steps” against its neighbour, as it considers sanctions to be “unhelpful”. “Restoring democratic order should be the priority of all stakeholders in Myanmar. The international community must lend its constructive support to the people of Myanmar at this critical juncture. We propose to continue with our developmental efforts so that people on the ground do not suffer,” said Indra Mani Pandey, India’s permanent representative to Geneva.
That being said, the last thing New Delhi wants is a failed and weakened Myanmar state at the clutches of Beijing, acting as its satellite state. Ultimately, India must take into consideration whether taking a more concrete stance on the actions of the Tatmadaw is worth the potential economic, strategic, and diplomatic risks. Equally, if India’s end goal is to emerge as a reputable and responsible world power, it must also consider how taking a non-committal stance in the face of demonstrable human rights abuses and violations could harm these aspirations.
India is Unlikely to Break its Silence on Myanmar. Here’s Why.
Myanmar lies at the intersection of India’s Act East and Neighbourhood First Policy, making it an indispensable part of the New Delhi’s strategic and economic calculations.
March 27, 2021
SOURCE: REUTERS